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Abstract 
Many of the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe have chosen to enact a vetting 
procedure known as lustration to ban former secret police agents and their informants 
from holding public office. This practice is part of a global trend toward increasing 
accountability for human rights violations. In this dissertation, lustration policies are 
examined within this context. First, an original dataset covering all post-Communist 
states in Europe and the former Soviet Union for the period 1989 to 2012 is used to 
analyze competing explanations for the proposal and enactment of lustration laws. 
Discrete-time logistic regression shows that democratization and control of the 
government by Left parties are strong predictors of lustration. Second, the extended case 
method is applied to the case of lustration to resolve a theoretical paradox. World polity 
neoinstitutionalist theory would predict that lustration should not be occurring. Drawing 
on insights and concepts from other areas within sociology, the paradox is resolved and a 
revised theoretical framework is proposed. Third, the cases of Croatia, Serbia, and 
Macedonia are examined using the strategic narrative method of historical sociology. The 
cases were chosen because of their varied outcomes with lustration—no law in Croatia, a 
law without enforcement in Serbia, and a law with enforcement in Macedonia. Analyses 
of these cases show both the power and the limits of path-dependent explanations in 
historical sociology. Finally, the implications of lustration for democratization and 
transitional justice are discussed. 
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Chapter 1. 
Lustration: An Introduction 
 
“Yet they lie deadly that tell you have good faces.” 
William Shakespeare, Coriolanus, Act II, scene i 
 
“We are living through an epochal transformation, one as yet young but already showing 
its muscle. … Yet if this transformation is indeed epochal, it has to engage the most 
complex institutional architecture we have ever produced: the national state.” So opens 
renowned sociologist Saskia Sassen’s (2006:1) monograph Territory Authority Rights. 
Sassen is speaking of the profound changes to the global order that have occurred since 
about 1980, induced by what is often described as neoliberal economic globalization. In 
her research, Sassen documents, among other phenomena, a hollowing out of democracy 
in liberal states that results from shifts in the balance of power within government. She 
finds that executive branches of government have been greatly expanding their power, 
with legislatures increasingly losing power and abdicating oversight responsibilities. 
Sassen’s opening words, however, could just as easily have been referring to another 
epochal transformation that has developed over roughly the same period: the emergence 
of transitional justice. 
 From the mid-1970s to the present, nation-states are increasingly likely to hold 
perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable for their actions. This trend, which has 
been labeled the “justice cascade” (Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Sikkink 2011), is an epochal 
transformation. Only in the twentieth century was the notion that governments’ actions 
could be deemed criminal instantiated (Savelsberg 2010). Thus, when Greece put its 
deposed military junta on trial for torture in 1975, a new era of accountability for state 
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crimes was realized. Beginning with the post-World War II trials against the Axis powers 
in Nuremberg and Tokyo,1 and continuing with the creation of the United Nations and the 
promulgation of an international legal architecture that codified human rights norms 
(Lauren 2003), the human rights regime has had powerful consequences for the national 
state. Recall Max Weber’s (1978 [1956]:54) famous definition of the state as that entity 
whose administrative staff “successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” [emphasis in the 
original]. I argue that, by redefining the scope of what counts as “legitimate,” the human 
rights regime has altered the very nature of the state. Moreover, the phenomenon of 
transitional justice may be read as a countervailing trend to the one described by Sassen. 
Instead of executives gaining power, as engendered by economic globalization, executive 
branches of government have had their power curtailed by and subordinated to 
judiciaries—and, as this dissertation will show, sometimes to legislatures—due to 
transitional justice. This represents a reconfiguration of the balance of power within 
nations. 
 This dissertation is an examination of one modality of transitional justice: 
lustration, or the disqualification from public office of human rights abusers. In the 
context of my research, lustration specifically refers to the disqualification from office of 
former secret police agents and their informants in post-Communist Europe. The secret 
police in the Communist states engaged in a range of abusive behavior designed to 
repress dissent and, in some cases, to instill terror in the population. They carried out 
assassinations and kidnappings; engaged in extensive surveillance of persons suspected 
                                                
1 Sikkink (2011) describes these important precursors as "streams" that fed into the eventual "cascade." 
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of political disloyalty; coerced testimony about potential targets from friends, neighbors, 
and relatives via blackmail, torture, and deception; and collected other kinds of 
intelligence (Adelman 1984). Table 1.1 below lists the relevant organizations from 
Communist Europe. 
 
Table 1.1 List of secret police organizations in Communist Europe 
 
In subsequent sections of this dissertation, one can find an implicit critique that 
lustration is often neither transitional nor just, leaving one to question the soundness of its 
ubiquitous inclusion in the academic literature on transitional justice. There are multiple 
reasons that a country, or a political party, might pursue lustration: to hold perpetrators of 
human rights violations accountable, to stabilize the new regime, to discredit potential 
rivals, or to settle old scores (Nalepa 2010). In fact, as will be shown in later chapters of 
this research, there is strong evidence that lustration is itself abusive and unlikely to 
contribute to goals of either justice or stability. But before offering further description of 
the dissertation, I will summarize how lustration is carried out. My account of the how of 
lustration will focus on one country, Macedonia, and should be regarded as illustrative 
rather than representative, as the details of lustration’s enactment vary by country. I will 
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then describe the fieldwork that was undertaken for this project and provide a synopsis of 
the empirical chapters that follow. 
 
How It Works: The Process of Lustration in the Republic of Macedonia2 
Under Macedonia’s most recent lustration law,3 adopted in June 2012, candidates 
for certain public offices must file an affidavit swearing that they were not collaborators 
with the UDBa, Yugoslavia’s secret police. Section 1, Article 3 of the law enumerates 30 
categories of public offices and other jobs that require candidates to be vetted. Examples 
of covered jobs include members of parliament, city mayors, senior employees of the 
national bank, members of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and Sciences, foreign 
diplomats sent from Macedonia to other countries, and representatives to international 
organizations. In addition to those offices, the law allows for the investigation of the 
country’s oligarchs who obtained enormous wealth in the 1990’s during the introduction 
                                                
2 As of this writing, there is no politically neutral name for this country located in Southeastern Europe. 
The country that I will call “Macedonia” has been locked in a dispute over its name with neighboring 
Greece since the former gained independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Greece insists that use of the name 
Macedonia by the Republic implies a territorial claim over the northern Greek province of the same name. 
There are real-world consequences to this disagreement. Greece has used its position as a member of the 
European Union and NATO to block Macedonia’s entry to those bodies on the basis of the name dispute 
(Marusic 2013). A recent proposal is to name the country "Upper Republic of Macedonia," but this was 
rejected by Greece. The latter country has offered "Republic of Upper Macedonia" and "Slavic-Albanian 
Macedonia" as alternatives (B92 2013). Until a final resolution is reached, some international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, refer to Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, or FYROM. The Macedonians I spoke to for this research indicated their deep disapproval with 
this appellation. The current Macedonian Prime Minister, Nicola Gruevski, gave a speech in October 2013 
in which he referred to Greece as the "Former Ottoman Province of Greece," or FOPOG (clip available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r099oSbl_NQ). Thus, no matter which name I use for Macedonia, I risk 
offending one side or the other. 
3 "Law to Determine the Condition of Limitation for Public Office, Access to Documents and Publication 
of Cooperation with the Organs of State Security," Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No.86, 
July 9, 2012. Available at www.kvf.org.mk 
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of a market economy and allows citizens to request lustration of persons suspected of 
complicity with the UDBa (Marusic 2012). 
An 11-member regulatory body, known as the Data Verification Commission, is 
appointed by parliament to conduct screenings of candidates for the covered offices. The 
ruling right-wing VMRO-DPMNE4 party appoints most members of the commission, but 
there is also representation from their junior coalition partner DUI,5 an ethnic Albanian 
party, and a representative backed by the opposition parties (Marusic 2013). In addition 
to current and prospective holders of the covered offices, the Commission also requires 
documentation from former public office holders to be lustrated retroactively. The 
Commission enlists the cooperation of other government agencies to provide names, 
fathers’ names, and identification numbers, and employment information on former 
office holders. The Commission screens applicants’ backgrounds by searching through 
the relevant UDBa dossiers for evidence of collaboration. These files are the result of the 
UDBa’s surveillance and other information-gathering activities. One person’s file can be 
several thousand pages long depending on how long a person was under surveillance and 
the type of activities that person engaged in. In response to a ruling by the Constitutional 
Court in early 20126 that struck down several provisions of an earlier lustration law and 
in a bid to increase transparency in the lustration process, the Commission posts relevant 
excerpts from the secret police files on its website7 for persons found to have been 
                                                
4 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
5 Democratic Union for Integration 
6 Case 76/2011-0-0; judgment rendered on January 25, 2012 
7 www.kvf.org.mk 
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collaborators. As of November 2013, the Commission had posted such “evidence”8 of 
secret police collaboration relating to 73 persons. High profile persons have been 
removed from office, including former president of the Constitutional Court Trendafil 
Ivanovski, who denies the Commission’s findings (Marusic 2010). 
 
 
 
 
Research Questions 
This dissertation was motivated by three questions related to lustration. 
1. “Why is lustration, rather than some other mechanism, the predominant method of 
transitional justice in the post-Communist states?” 
 
I address this question in Chapter 3 by employing a version of Michael Burawoy’s 
extended case method to the diffusion of lustration laws. I emphasize cultural and 
historical reasons why lustration is the preferred method, as well as the structural reasons 
that foreclose other options, particularly trials. I use documentary evidence from NGOs, 
courts, parliaments, and other official bodies, as well as interview excerpts as the data for 
chapter 3. 
 
2. “Why do some states lustrate, while others do not?”  
I address this question in two different ways, relying on both variable-oriented and case-
oriented methods (Ragin 1987). First, in chapter 2, I use discrete-time event history 
models, a variable-oriented method, to assess the utility of five explanatory theories about 
                                                
8 It must be noted that claims as to the truth-revelatory nature of the secret police files in any post-
Communist country are debatable at best. Further elaboration of this point will be made in Chapter 3. 
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factors leading to the implementation of lustration. The original quantitative dataset used 
in chapter 2 covers all post-Communist states. 
Second, in chapter 4, I use strategic narrative (Stryker 1996), a case-oriented 
method, to elaborate on mechanisms that can explain the statistical associations found in 
chapter 2. In the later set of chapters, I focus on two former Yugoslav republics--Croatia 
and Serbia--and use interview, survey, and historical data to analyze the cases. 
 
3. “What are the consequences of lustration?” 
Chapters 3 addresses the consequences of lustration, with a particular focus on its 
negative consequences. I do not attempt to answer the question of whether lustration is 
“good” for democracy, but its potential for abuse is clear—perhaps more so than with any 
other method of transitional justice. 
 By addressing these research questions, this project sheds additional light on 
transitional justice, generally, and its relationship to the institutions of democracy. In the 
conclusion, I will offer reflections on the categorization of lustration with the transitional 
justice paradigm, the type of institutional reform that may be fostered by lustration 
policies in comparison to the kinds of reforms to which it is not suited, and the effects of 
transitional justice on the interrelationships among the branches of government in liberal 
democracies. 
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Methods 
 
Undergirding this research is fieldwork conducted on two trips to Southeastern 
Europe during the winter and summer of 2011. I conducted semi-structured interviews 
with 30 key informants in four cities: Belgrade, Serbia; Skopje, Macedonia; Thessaloniki, 
Greece; and Zagreb, Croatia. Among those interviewed were lawyers, academics, 
members of parliament, civil servants, NGO representatives, and a member of the 
Macedonian lustration commission. The initial interviewees were chosen for their 
participation in a lustration-promotion project headed by the Thessaloniki-based Center 
for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE). The project, known 
as "Disclosing Hidden History: Lustration in the Western Balkans," was a collaboration 
among NGOs from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia in the 
early 2000's. The NGOs organized several meetings in the region, bringing together 
academics, lawyers, journalists, and politicians to discuss the pros and cons of lustration 
for the Western Balkans. Materials from the project are available online 
(www.lustration.net). Using those materials, I assembled a list of approximately 90 
participants in the project that I would like to interview. I contacted as many of the 
persons for whom I could find an e-mail address, phone number, LinkedIn profile, or 
other online presence to arrange interviews during my two trips to Southeastern Europe. 
Of those who responded to me, all agreed to be interviewed. There were many potential 
informants who did not respond, either because they did not want to be interviewed or 
because my contact information for them was out of date, and some for whom I could not 
find any contact information. 
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I interviewed 20 CDRSEE participants. At each interview, I asked if there was 
someone else who they recommended that I should speak to. In some cases, they 
recommended people with whom I already had spoken to. In other cases, they provided 
me with new contacts. In total, I spoke with 30 informants. The interviewees had a range 
of opinion on lustration—some supported it, some opposed it, and some had altered their 
position on the matter over time. The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours and, 
with one exception,9 were conducted in English. The interviews, again with one 
exception,10 were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed for key themes. I refer to the 
interviews throughout the dissertation, particularly in chapters 3-6. Where possible, I 
identify the informants by name and position, but several informants requested 
anonymity. 
In addition to the interviews, I obtained numerous documents from NGOs and 
parliaments while in Southeastern Europe. These documents include reports from 
CDRSEE's partner NGOs, parliamentary records from the Croatian Sabor and the Serbian 
National Assembly, and filings made by the Macedonian lustration commission. I have 
also made judicious use of news sources from the region, particularly online sources such 
as Balkan Insight. Balkan Insight provides original reporting on the entire Balkan region 
and has as part of its mission a focus on transitional justice. It was, therefore, an 
indispensable source of information on contemporaneous developments with respect to 
                                                
9 The interview that relied on an interpreter was with Novica Veljanovski, a member of the Macedonian 
lustration commission. Because my spoken Macedonian is not adequate for an interview on the subject of 
lustration, Dr. Veljanovski arranged to have an interpreter who normally works for the parliament available 
for our meeting. 
10 For the one interview that was not recorded, I must rely on notes that I took during the interview. Thus, 
any quotations from that informant have been rendered in oratio obliqua. The interview was with an 
eminent historian of Croatia who preferred not to be recorded.	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lustration in the region, particularly in Macedonia, and the "Lex Perkovic" scandal in 
Croatia. 
Finally, I relied on secondary sources to provide historical context to post-
Communist politics and to provide the basis for original analysis. In particular, the 
historiography of the former Yugoslavia developed by such scholars as John Lampe 
(2000) and Ivo Goldstein (1999) was foundational to my understanding of my cases. Case 
studies by other scholars who have written about lustration, specifically, served as 
valuable sources of information on dates of proposal and adoption of lustration laws, 
which were used for the quantitative analysis in Chapter 2. The edited volume by Stan 
(2008) was especially useful in this regard. The other significant secondary data that I 
make use of is the Quality of Government (Teorell, et al 2013) dataset, which compiles 
country-year data on a range of important variables that I use in the analysis in Chapter 2. 
 The use of these assorted approaches classifies this dissertation as one of the 
“mixed-methods” variety. My research design is both “concurrent” and “complementary” 
(Small 2011). By concurrent, I mean that the data need not have been gathered in any 
particular order. Sufficient background investigation was necessary to conduct useful 
semi-structured interviews with key informants, but I did not conduct formal qualitative 
analysis of documents—such as those from parliaments or NGOs—prior to the 
interviews. Readers may find fault with this approach, but concurrent collection of 
various forms of data was necessary due to the relatively short amount of time that I was 
able to spend in the Western Balkans. By complementary, I mean that I use multiple 
kinds of data so as to build arguments from many directions at once, rather than for 
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purposes of confirmation or triangulation. Different kinds of data are necessary for 
answering different kinds of questions. The quantitative data are useful for showing the 
interrelationships of variables over many countries and years, but they do not provide rich 
detail as to the enactment (or lack thereof) of lustration policies. Qualitative data, on the 
other hand, are able to fill out the picture that can only briefly be sketched by numeric 
data. A mixed-methods approach, therefore, enabled me to answer questions that could 
not have been answered with any one method of analysis or any one type of data. 
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Chapter 2.  
The Consideration and Adoption of Lustration, 1989-2012 
 
"Is it not strange that desire should so many years outlive performance?" 
William Shakespeare, Henry IV Part II 
 
 
Research seeking to explain the enactment of lustration laws in Eastern Europe 
has paid little attention to issues of time and has been based on a limited set of cases. 
Early work by scholars of democratic transitions (e.g., Huntington 1991; Elster 1996) 
posited that transitional justice mechanisms like lustration, if they were to happen at all, 
would happen shortly after the collapse of state socialism in 1989 and 1991, and their 
enactment would be dependent on the mode of exit from authoritarianism. More recent 
scholarship on this subject has also focused on time-invariant explanations, such as the 
level of Communist-era repression (Nedelsky 2004), the extent of pre-Communist 
experience with political pluralism (Stan 2008), or deals made by elites at the time of 
transition (Nalepa 2010). The emphasis in the literature on these explanations is puzzling. 
Although lustration was sometimes employed in the transitional years of the early 1990s, 
lustration efforts have not been confined to that period. More than two decades after 
transition, lawmakers in countries like Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Georgia, continue to 
renew lustration legislation, change the scope of existing legislation, and propose and 
adopt new legislation. 
Moreover, the literature has tended to focus on only a handful of positive cases of 
lustration—that is, countries that have formally enacted some version of the policy. Some 
countries’ policies have received extensive scholarly, media, and civil society attention—
most notably, Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (see, for 
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example, David 2003; Williams, Sczerbiak, and Fowler 2005; Barrett et al. 2007; 
Czarnota 2007; Priban 2007; Nalepa 2010; Choi and David 2012) and, to a lesser extent, 
the former German Democratic Republic (Milosavljevic and Pavicevic 2002; Wilke 
2007). The experience of lustration in most other countries, particularly in Southeastern 
Europe and the Baltic states, has received comparatively little scholarly attention. When 
such attention does occur, it is often from a narrow range of analysts. For example, one 
scholar, Lavinia Stan, has produced most of the research on Romanian lustration (e.g, 
Stan 2006, 2011, 2012). The analysis of negative cases (Emigh 1997) of lustration—that 
is, countries that might be expected to adopt the policy but have not done so—has been 
ignored almost entirely. A notable exception is the research of Nedelsky (2004), who 
analyzes Slovakia’s initial lack of lustration after separating from the Czech Republic in 
1993, despite its inheritance of the 1991 Czechoslovak screening law. From one point of 
view, the large literature on the Central European cases is to be expected given that those 
are the countries that have pursued lustration policies most vigorously. I argue, however, 
that more can be learned by incorporating the experiences of other countries into our 
analysis of these laws. 
This chapter fills some of the gaps created by previous scholarship. It examines 
the temporal dimensions of lustration by employing discrete-time logistic regression on a 
new dataset covering 29 post-Communist states from 1989 to 2012. This method allows 
for the evaluation of competing explanations about the enactment of lustration and, by 
encompassing the entirety11 of the European and Soviet post-Communist space, includes 
                                                
11 The dataset does not include the Republic of Kosovo, a partially recognized state that unilaterally 
declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Kosovo exists as a de facto independent state with its own 
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all positive and negative cases of lustration. The chapter provides further methodological 
innovation on the subject of lustration by separately analyzing two aspects of the 
legislative process—the proposal of a lustration bill and its adoption into law. Prior 
research has not adequately addressed these separate processes. It may be the case that 
the factors that drive the proposal of a bill are not the same factors that lead to a bill’s 
adoption as law. This chapter answers the question, “What conditions affect whether and 
when lustration policies are considered and adopted?” 
 
Overview of Explanatory Models of Lustration 
Table 2.1 shows the date of the first known proposal of a lustration bill in a 
country’s parliament and the date of the passage of the first known lustration law.12 It 
should be made clear that these are not necessarily the same piece of legislation. That is, 
the first proposed bill might not be the bill that is ultimately enacted into law. The 
information contained in the table was gathered from a number of sources, including 
scholarly case studies and online news sources. 
 The table highlights the dynamic nature of the adoption of lustration policies. 
Perhaps the most striking fact revealed by the table is that most countries that have 
adopted one lustration law have adopted at least one other such law. Often successive 
                                                                                                                                            
parliament that, hypothetically, could have adopted a lustration law in the past 5 years—just as it adopted a 
controversial amnesty law in 2013 aimed at easing the integration process of its Serb minority population 
(Peci 2013). It, therefore, could reasonably be considered as a negative case of lustration. However, its 
disputed legal status means that it is not included in many of the widely used cross-national datasets. Thus, 
Kosovo’s omission from the analysis as an independent entity is due to the lack of available data on most 
covariates and should not be taken as indicative of the author’s personal views on the status of the territory. 
12 Appendix 2.1 is attached to the end of this chapter and contains the names of the first lustration laws. 
Readers will note that there is a wide range of ways that lustration laws are framed. Because almost every 
country offers a different framing for the laws, it is not possible to use statistical analysis to determine 
which kinds of framings are most associated with passage of the laws. 
  15 
laws are adopted because the first law has expired, is struck down through judicial 
review, or is modified by the legislature in some way. Also worthy of mention is that fact 
that the adoption of these laws continues many years after the collapse of state socialism 
and single-party Communist party rule. Such persistence is notable given the nature of 
who is targeted by lustration policies and the sanctions they administer. Given that 
lustration is meant to remove certain persons from public office, one might expect that 
the passage of time should lead to natural attrition and make the laws less necessary as 
targeted persons leave public life through retirement, career transitions, death, or 
emigration. This point was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
their ruling on the 2008 case Ādamsons v Latvia13 
 
Finally, national authorities must keep in mind that lustration measures are, by 
their nature temporary, the objective necessity of a restriction of individual rights 
resulting from this procedure decreases with time (Sweeney 2013: 143). 
 
Despite this natural attrition, the analysis below shows that the odds of considering or 
adopting lustration do not decrease with time. Such a finding suggests that motives other 
than achieving stability in new democracies by cleansing the state of personnel from the 
previous regime may be behind these policies. The topics of motives and consequences 
will be explored with respect to the former Yugoslavia in Chapters 4-6. 
 
                                                
13 Mr. Ādamsons was a former KGB border guard in Latvia who was denied the ability to stand for 
elections under the 1995 Latvian lustration law. The ECtHR ruled that a blanket ban on seeking office for 
KGB employees was not acceptable. Instead, disqualification must be considered on a case-by-case basis 
and depend on the nature of a person’s work for the KGB. The case also provided an occasion for the 
ECtHR to summarize their collective jurisprudence to date on lustration, as seen in the above quotation. 
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State Year Enters Dataset 
Year Lustration 
First Proposed 
Year of First 
Lustration Law 
Enacted 
Year(s) of 
Successive 
Lustration Laws 
Albania 1991 1995 1995 1995, 1998, 2008 
Armenia 1991 2011     
Azerbaijan 1991       
Belarus 1991       
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 1992       
Bulgaria 1989 1991 1992 1992, 1997, 2002 
Croatia 1991 1998     
Czechoslovakia 1989 1990 1991 1991 
Czech Republic 1993  1995 1995 2000, 2007 
Slovak Republic 1993  2002 2002   
Estonia 1991 1991 1995 1995 
Georgia 1991 2005 2011   
(East) Germany 1989 1990 1990   
Hungary 1989 1989 1994 1996, 2000, 2001 
Kazakhstan 1991       
Kyrgyzstan 1991 2010     
Latvia 1991 1991 1994 1994, 1995  
Lithuania 1991 1991 1991 1991, 1999 
Macedonia 1991 2006 2008 2011, 2012 
Moldova 1991 2000    
Montenegro 2006 2007     
Poland 1989 1989 1997 2006  
Romania 1989 1990 1999 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
Russia 1991 1992    
Serbia 1991 2003 2003   
Slovenia 1991 1990     
Tajikistan 1991       
Turkmenistan 1991       
Ukraine 1991 2005     
Uzbekistan 1991       
Table 2.1. Timing of Lustration Consideration and Adoption in Post-Communist State 
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“Politics of the Past” Explanations14 
Samuel Huntington’s (1991) study of the “third wave” of democracy—that is, the 
many cases of (re)democratization that began in Southern Europe in 1974 and eventually 
spread to Latin America, Eastern Europe, and parts of Africa and Asia—develops a 
classification scheme for transitions to democracy. He identifies three kinds of transition: 
replacement, transformation, and transplacement. A replacement transition is one in 
which the push for democracy comes mostly from the opposition, and the authoritarian 
regime collapses or is overthrown. A transformation transition occurs when reformers 
within the authoritarian regime lead the transition to democracy. A transplacement 
transition is a combination of the two other types, involving negotiations between the 
authoritarian regime and the opposition for the former’s exit. Huntington argues that 
transitional justice—or, in his words, “dealing with the torturer problem”—is most likely 
to occur when there has been a replacement transition. A regime that has been replaced is 
one that has been defeated and discredited. In brief, it lacks any ability to protect itself 
from retaliation. Such is not the case in the other types of transitional societies. In the 
context of a transformation transition, a regime that maintains power while introducing 
liberalizing reforms is unlikely to punish itself. In the transplacement transition context, 
where both the regime and opposition are weak, an outgoing regime has the opportunity 
to negotiate amnesty for itself, thereby escaping punishment. 
With regard to timing, Huntington argues, “In new democracies, justice comes 
quickly, or it does not come at all” (1991:228). While it is clear from Table 1 that it is not 
                                                
14 I borrow the terms “politics of the past” and “politics of the present” from Stan (2008). 
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true that justice—in the form of lustration—must come quickly or not at all,15 it remains 
possible that countries experiencing a replacement transition may propose or adopt 
lustration earlier than countries undergoing other types of transitions. Thus, from 
Huntington’s work we derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Lustration will be both considered and adopted earlier in countries 
with transitions characterized by replacement. Lustration will be both considered 
and adopted later in countries with transitions characterized by transformation or 
transplacement and in those countries where democracy has not been established. 
 
Replacement Transformation Transplacement No Sustained 
Democracy 
Armenia 
Bosnia 
Croatia 
East Germany 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Romania 
Serbia/Montenegro 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Macedonia 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Czechoslovakia 
Poland 
Slovenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Table 2.2. Author’s classification of post-Communist regime transitions using 
Huntington’s Third Wave typology 
 
Comparative research by Stan (2008, 2009) argues that the pursuit of lustration is 
determined by the institutionalization of anti-Communist groups. Such 
institutionalization is best achieved through a combination of three factors: the strength of 
the anti-Communist opposition both pre- and post-1989, the relationship of elites to the 
Communist system (either repression or co-optation), and the extent of a country’s pre-
Communist experience with political pluralism. Stan proposes two groups of countries, 
                                                
15 Huntington’s argument is also debunked with respect to trials and truth commissions by Sikkink (2011). 
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identified below. Group 116 is characterized by a strong pre-Communist experience of 
democracy; a relatively broad-based and strong opposition consisting of dissidents, mass 
mobilization, and internally exiled technocrats; and repression of elites. These countries 
include the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Hungary. 
Group 2 is characterized by little pre-Communist experience with democracy, weak 
opposition, and co-optation of elites. This group includes Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, 
and the former Soviet Union other than the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
Stan’s research, and thus her categorization, does not include the former 
Yugoslavia or Albania. It is necessary, therefore, to accommodate those states in her 
paradigm in order to test the applicability of her findings to the entire post-Communist 
region. Yugoslavia, in particular, defies easy categorization. Despite the early co-optation 
of elites, later events, such as the Croatian Spring roughly from 1969-1972, led to a break 
of the elites with the regime and resulted in their widespread repression, particularly 
intellectuals and artists (Burg 1983; Lampe 2000), suggesting categorization with Group 
1. However, the anti-Communist opposition movement in Yugoslavia was relatively 
weak due in large part to ethnic fractionalization (Simons 1990). Further, there is 
relatively little pre-Communist experience with democracy. To the extent that such 
experience exists anywhere in the former Yugoslavia, it would be in Slovenia and 
Croatia, due to their inclusion in the Austro-Hungarian Empire rather than the Ottoman 
Empire, which subsumed the other Yugoslav republics.  However, Allcock (2000:252) 
argues that Slovenia and Croatia’s history of democracy is “an ideological distortion of 
history” and that they “displayed relatively rudimentary development of a culture of 
                                                
16 “Group 1” and “Group 2” are my terms, not Stan’s. 
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democratic representation before unification [i.e., before 1918].” Later, ethnic 
fractionalization between Croats and Serbs during the interwar period led to the failure of 
democratic institutions in Yugoslavia’s federalist system (Djokic 2007). These factors 
suggest it is more appropriate to place Yugoslavia into Stan’s Group 2. Thus, because 
these countries share features of both Group 1 and Group 2, I place the former Yugoslav 
republics and Albania into their own category, Group 3. 
Hypothesis 2: Lustration will be both considered and adopted earlier in Group 1 
countries due to their broad-based and organized opposition, repressed rather than 
co-opted elites, and relatively deep history of political pluralism. Lustration will 
be both considered and adopted later in both Group 2 and Group 3 countries, 
which have less conducive configurations of the aforementioned characteristics. 
 
 
“Politics of the Present” Explanations 
 In contrast to explanations of lustration that emphasize country histories up to the 
point of transition, other authors have privileged post-Communist factors in the adoption 
of lustration, such as coalition building and legislative framing (Williams et al 2005). 
Welsh (1994) argues that the adoption of lustration is most dependent on the electoral 
success of Communist successor political parties. Those that are able to maintain power 
in the post-Communist period are unlikely to adopt lustration legislation, as it would 
likely have a disproportionate impact on members of their own coalitions and their 
supporters. As a corollary, lustration is more likely to be adopted when anti-Communist 
parties are in power, as they would like to punish the former regime.  
Hypothesis 3A: The ideology of the largest political party will have no bearing 
on whether or when lustration bills are proposed because such proposals can 
come from minority parties. 
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Hypothesis 3B: Lustration is more likely to be adopted when Right political 
parties are the largest in parliament than when Left or centrist parties are the 
largest. 
 
One of the few studies to analyze negative cases of lustration is the comparison of 
the Czech and Slovak Republics by Nedelsky (2004). Although Slovakia did eventually 
adopt a limited lustration system in 2002, it initially opted upon gaining independence in 
1993 not to enforce the 1991 lustration law it inherited from Czechoslovakia. She argues 
that an important factor explaining the difference was the perceived legitimacy of the 
former regime.  
The higher a society’s view of the previous regime’s legitimacy, the lower its 
motivation to pursue justice for its authorities and the higher the likelihood … that 
it will allow elites associated with the former regime to return to the political 
stage. (ibid, p. 88). 
 
Hypothesis 4: Lustration will be more likely to be proposed and adopted in 
countries that perceive the Communist regime to be illegitimate. 
 
Finally, scholars operating in the world polity neoinstitutionalist tradition argue 
that policies are most likely to be adopted when they are promoted by transnational 
actors, including intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations 
(Meyer et al 1997). In the case of lustration, many of the messages provided by 
transnational actors emphasize the drawbacks and potential abuses of lustration 
systems.17 In particular, ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 111 on 
Employment and Occupation Discrimination should be associated with not adopting 
                                                
17	  The	  world	  polity	  perspective	  and	  the	  attitudes	  of	  transnational	  actors	  toward	  lustration	  will	  be	  
addressed	  in	  lingering	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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lustration policies, or at least adopting such policies at a slower rate. As I will show in the 
following chapter, the bodies tasked with enforcing both of these treaties have 
consistently delivered anti-lustration findings and advisory opinions. 
Hypothesis 5A: Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights will 
be associated with a lower likelihood of proposing or adopting lustration. 
 
Hypothesis 5B: Ratification of ILO Convention No. 111 will be associated with a 
lower likelihood of proposing or adopting lustration. 
 
 
Data, Methods, and Measures 
 
To test whether and how the “politics of the past” and the “politics of the present” 
explanations affect the proposal and passage of lustration legislation, I employ an event 
history analysis that demonstrates if key variables, derived from the above hypotheses, 
affect these disqualifying measures. For covariates, I use country-year data taken from 
the Quality of Government (QoG) Standard Dataset (Teorell, et al 2013), the Life in 
Transition Survey (EBRD 2006), and secondary sources, especially Stan (2008). For the 
dependent variables, I rely on the same sources that produced Table 2.1 above. 
 
Covariates 
I test the seven hypotheses18 described above within the limits of the available 
data for 1989 to 2012. For Hypotheses 1 and 2, I constructed dummy variables that group 
                                                
18 It is perhaps worthwhile to reflect on alternative explanations of lustration that are not covered in this 
chapter, as they do not lend themselves to statistical analysis or because the data are not available on a 
sufficient number of countries. An obvious omission is the degree of repression that each state faced under 
Communism. One might hypothesize that the desire for retribution would be strongest in states that 
experienced the worst repression at the hands of the secret police. The data that are normally used to 
measure such repression, the Political Terror Scale (PTS), have a couple of problems that prevent their use 
in this chapter. 1) The data only go back to 1976. This means that much of the worst repression in the 
Soviet Union, for example, is not captured. 2) Countries that have been newly created since the end of the 
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countries into the relevant categories. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is tested with a dichotomous 
variable that indicates whether the country experienced a replacement transition. The 
reference category is, therefore, countries that experienced any other kind of transition. 
For Hypothesis 2, the omitted reference category is Group 1—that is, countries with a 
history of democracy and well-developed opposition. 
For Hypotheses 3A and 3B, I use the variable labeled dpi_gprlc1 in the QoG 
dataset. The variable indicates whether the largest government party is left, right, or 
center with respect to economic policy. The QoG (2013:153) codebook enumerates the 
following criteria for coding the ideology of political parties: 
Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or right-
wing.  
Left: for parties that are defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or 
left-wing.  
Center: for parties that are defined as centrist or when party position can best be 
described as centrist (e.g. party advocates strengthening private enterprise in a 
social-liberal context). Not described as centrist if competing factions “average 
out” to a centrist position (e.g. a party of “right-wing Muslims and Beijing-
oriented Marxists”). 
There are no Center parties in the dataset for the country-years included in this analysis. 
The reference category in the analysis is Right. I have also included a category for 
                                                                                                                                            
Cold War do not exist in the data as independent states. This means there is no way to tell from PTS data 
whether, for example, Macedonia was subjected to more or less repression than Slovenia. There is only a 
single score for all of Yugoslavia for each country-year. 
Another possible explanation for lustration’s implementation in some countries rather than others 
is the extent to which Communist personnel still permeate the agencies of power, including the legislature 
and other bodies. It is easy to find individual examples of this in any country (e.g., Vladimir Putin in 
Russia, who is a former KGB agent); it is much harder, though, to determine to what extent it is the case in 
any given country or to devise a metric that would allow one to gauge the relative degrees of such 
permeation across countries. 
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“Unclassified” political parties to reduce the amount of missing data on the dpi_gprlc1 
variable. 
For Hypothesis 4, I measure the legitimacy of the Communist regime using a 
variable constructed from data taken from the 2006 Life in Transition Survey (LITS). The 
survey included two questions asking respondents what type of economy (market vs. 
planned) and what type of government (democratic vs. authoritarian) they prefer.19 I 
assess the legitimacy of the Communist regime as the percentage of respondents who 
prefer a planned economy combined with an authoritarian government.  
For Hypotheses 5A and 5B, I used the websites of the Council of Europe and the 
International Labor Organization, respectively, to create dummy variables indicating 
whether the relevant treaty had been ratified in a given year. 
 
Control Variables 
I control for per capita gross domestic product (taken from QoG); level of 
democratization (taken from QoG); and time measured as a dummy variable representing 
the years 2000-2012.20 The per capita GDP measure has been logged to reduce skewness. 
The democratization measure ranges from 0 to 10 and uses imputed values from the 
Freedom House political rights and civil liberties scores when data are missing from the 
Polity IV democratization variable. These scores are assigned on a country-year basis and 
are meant to indicate the competitiveness of political participation, the regulation of 
                                                
19 Both survey items allow respondents to choose a third option: “For people like me it does not matter” 
20 The omitted reference category is 1989-1999. I use this cut point because Resolution 1096 from the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (1996) declares that lustration systems should be 
complete by December 31, 1999. 
  25 
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the chief executive (Center for Systemic Peace 2013). Higher scores 
indicate higher levels of democracy. While such measures are sometimes criticized for 
being a static checklist that ignores the important processes that shape relations between 
citizens and the state in liberal democracies (Tilly 2007), they are the best measures 
available for quantitative research that examines multiple countries over multiple years. 
 
Dependent Variables 
I code a country-year as “1” to indicate when a lustration bill is first known to be 
proposed and, separately, when a lustration law is first known to be adopted. Years 
before a lustration bill is proposed or a law is adopted are coded as “0.” This data is taken 
from secondary sources such as Stan (2008), Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff (2007), Nalepa 
(2010), and online news sources including Balkan Insight21.  
 
Statistical Models 
I model the proposal and adoption of lustration laws using event history analysis because 
the method allows for the easy incorporation of right-censored cases—that is, those 
countries that have not yet proposed or adopted lustration as of the last year in the data, 
2012—and time-varying covariates (Allison 1984; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004; 
Behrens, Uggen, and Manza 2003). To correctly handle censored cases, countries are 
only included in the data when they are at risk of proposing or adopting a lustration 
measure. Thus, countries enter the risk set upon the collapse of the Communist system in 
                                                
21	  www.balkaninsight.com	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that state, when a state becomes independent, or when free elections are first held. For 
example, Montenegro is not at risk of either proposing or adopting a lustration law until 
its secession from Serbia in 2006. Montenegro is, therefore, not in the data until 2006. 
Conversely, Czechoslovakia disappears from the dataset after 1992 due to its dissolution 
on January 1, 1993. The ability to include time-varying covariates is important for 
assessing the impact of “the politics of the present” because variables like the ideology of 
the largest political party in government change over the period 1989-2012. 
 I estimate the effects of the independent variables described above using a 
discrete-time logistic regression model with the following equation: 
. 
The function specifies Pit in terms of the log-odds ratio of the probability of an event (i.e., 
that a lustration bill is proposed or that a lustration law is passed) occurring in country i at 
time t to the probability of a nonevent. β is the effect of the independent variables; X1, X2, 
… Xk denote independent variables; and αt represents a set of constants corresponding to 
each discrete-time unit (i.e., 1989-1999, 2000-2012).22 
 
Results 
Bivariate Analysis: Proposal of Lustration Bills 
Table 2.3 presents the results of 10 separate discrete-time logistic event history models 
predicting the proposal of a country’s first lustration bill. These models do not include 
                                                
22 I also estimated models using a linear time variable. The results did not change. 
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statistical controls, except for time measured as a dummy variable for the period 2000-
2012.23 
 
Table 2.3 Bivariate event history models showing factors affecting the proposal of lustration laws. 
 
The bivariate results show that the “politics of the past” arguments are associated 
with the proposal of lustration. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, countries that experienced a 
replacement transition are more likely to propose lustration than those that did not. There 
is also support for Hypothesis 2: countries characterized by strong opposition 
                                                
23 Because the data contain repeated observations on the same cases (i.e., countries), the observations are 
not independent and are, therefore, subject to autocorrelation of error terms. This is a problem for 
probabilistic analyses, as it results in inaccurate variance estimation. Underestimated standard errors run the 
risk of conferring statistical significance where in fact none exists. To correct for autocorrelation, all 
statistical models presented in the chapter make use of robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. 
Analyses were conducted with Stata 12 using the stset, logistic, and cluster commands. 
  28 
movements, repressed elites, and a history of political pluralism are more likely to 
propose lustration than countries with other configurations of those three factors. 
There is mixed support for the “politics of the present” arguments. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 3A, there is no relationship between the ideology of the largest party in 
parliament and the likelihood of proposing a lustration bill. However, there is no support 
for Hypothesis 4. The results show that there is no relationship between lustration 
proposal and support for a combination of authoritarian governance and a planned 
economy.24 There is no support for Hypotheses 5A. Countries that have ratified the 
European Convention on Human Rights are more likely to have proposed lustration bills. 
Under the tenets of world polity neoinstitutionalism, ratification should make countries 
less likely to support lustration. Similarly, there is no support for Hypothesis 5B. WPN 
suggests that ratification of ILO Convention No. 111 should be negatively associated 
with proposal of lustration laws. The results show there to be no statistical relationship 
between the two variables when controlling for time. Finally, the control variables 
suggest positive relationships between a country’s wealth and level of democracy on the 
likelihood of proposing a lustration bill. 
 
 
 
                                                
24 Ideally, this measure would be time varying, as it is likely to change depending on the political and 
economic circumstances at any given time. It is also likely to change depending on how much time has 
elapsed since the collapse of Communism. However, I was only able to obtain data for all countries at two 
time points, 2006 and 2010. I decided to use 2006 data on the assumption that responses to the 2010 data, 
particularly on the question dealing with the preferred type of economy, would have been affected by the 
2007-8 global financial crisis. 
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Multivariate Analysis: Proposal of Lustration Bills25 
 
Table 2.4 Trimmed multivariate model predicting the odds of proposing a lustration bill, N=264 
 
The trimmed multivariate model in Table 2.4 shows results with full controls for 
both the “politics of the past” and the “politics of the present” approaches. Huntington’s 
(1991) argument about countries that experience replacement transitions being more 
likely to adopt transitional justice holds true with respect to the proposal of lustration bills 
in parliament. A country with a replacement transition, such as Romania, is 289% more 
likely, net of other factors, to propose lustration than a country that underwent a different 
type of transition. While Stan’s arguments about the strength of the political opposition, 
the relationship between the government and elites, and a country’s history of political 
pluralism received bivariate support, this support disappears in the multivariate model. 
This is likely due to the introduction of the level of democratization as a control variable 
                                                
25 Due to the relatively small sample size, only variables with bivariate effects are included in this 
“trimmed” model. 
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because countries with a history of democracy and well-organized opposition are going to 
have higher levels of democracy in the present than those that lack such an infrastructure. 
Each one-point increase on QoG’s 10-point democratization scale is associated with a 
47% increase in the odds of proposing a lustration bill. This finding will be explored in 
the discussion section of this chapter. 
 
Bivariate Analysis: Lustration Law Adoption 
Next, I present bivariate results that model the adoption of a lustration law, controlling 
for time period, in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5 Bivariate event history models showing factors affecting the adoption of lustration laws. 
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With respect to the adoption by parliament of a lustration law, there is only 
marginal support for Huntington’s argument that countries undergoing a replacement 
transition are more likely to adopt such a measure than countries with other kinds of 
transitions (Hypothesis 1). The odds ratio is not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Stan’s arguments about the strength of the political opposition and history of 
democracy (Hypothesis 2) are supported. The odds of adopting a lustration law in 
countries with a weak opposition, co-opted elites, and little history of democracy are 87% 
lower than in other countries. There is also support for Hypothesis 3B: when a Left party 
is in power, the odds of adopting a lustration law are 94% lower than when a Right party 
is in power. There is no support for Hypotheses 4, 5A, or 5B. The coefficient for 
Communist legitimacy is not significant at conventional levels, and the coefficients for 
treaty ratification are not significant in the direction that would be consistent with world 
polity theory. There are positive and statistically significant bivariate relationships 
between lustration adoption and both logged GDP and level of democratization. 
 
Multivariate Analysis: Lustration Law Adoption 
The multivariate model presented in Table 2.6 shows odds ratios for the likelihood of 
adopting a lustration law. This analysis shows that only Hypothesis 3B is supported. Net 
of other factors, Left parties are 96% less likely than Right parties to adopt a lustration 
law. The only other statistically significant result is level of democratization. Each one-
point increase on the 10-point democracy scale is associated with a 208% increase in the 
odds of adopting lustration. 
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Table 2.6 Multivariate models showing odds ratios for adopting a lustration law 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the merits of five arguments about the consideration and 
adoption of lustration measures in the post-Communist region. Three of the arguments, 
advanced by Huntington (1991), Stan (2008, 2009), and Welsh (1994), received at least 
some support in either the bivariate or multivariate models. The arguments that did not 
receive support from the evidence tested here are the world polity neoinstitutionalist 
model and the legitimacy argument put forth by Nedelsky (2004). With respect to the 
former, I argue that the lack of support is because lustration actually presents a paradox 
for the WPN theoretical perspective. That is, lustration is a policy that does diffuse when 
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WPN suggests it should not. I develop this argument in the following chapter and offer 
suggestions about how WPN can be retooled to account for the diffusion of lustration 
policies. As for Nedelsky’s legitimacy argument, it is only marginally significant at the 
p<.10 level in bivariate analyses for the adoption of lustration. There is a possible 8% 
decrease in the odds of adopting lustration for every 1% increase in support for autocratic 
governance in combination with a planned economy. However, the p-value is large 
enough that this finding could be due to random variation. It could be argued that there is 
a better way of operationalizing “legitimacy of the Communist regime” than the approach 
I have taken, but I have not found other survey data that approximates this variable and is 
available for every country in the region. 
 With respect to the three arguments that each receive at least some support from 
the evidence presented in this chapter, it is clear that there is a mixture of both the politics 
of the past and the politics of the present that affect the consideration and adoption of 
lustration measures. In particular, the politics of the past are important predictors for the 
proposal of lustration. Countries that undergo replacement transitions, have a strong 
opposition, and have a history of democracy are more likely to propose lustration bills. 
The finding about replacement transitions, in particular, is consistent with research on 
other forms of transitional justice. Sikkink (2011) found that countries that experienced 
“ruptured” transitions to democracy, like Greece, Portugal, and Argentina, were more 
likely to prosecute former leaders for human rights abuses than countries like Spain and 
Uruguay that experienced “negotiated” democratic transitions around the same time.  
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This chapter shows the “politics of the present” to be more important than the 
politics of the past when it comes to the adoption, rather than the consideration, of 
lustration laws. Consistent with Welsh’s (1994) research, Left political parties are less 
likely to adopt lustration than Right political parties. Importantly, the level of 
democratization is also significant. At first glance, this finding appears intuitive: 
democratic states should be more likely to reckon with their abusive pasts, as they should 
have more respect for human rights than autocratic states. In the case of lustration, 
though, this finding about democracy is curious because the laws themselves are in a 
sense anti-democratic. They are designed to limit participation in government, something 
that is not conducive to “free and fair” elections. 
The strong finding that democracy matters must be explained. It is a particularly 
striking in light of the fact that Huntington’s argument about the mode of establishing 
democracy does not hold up under multivariate scrutiny. An alternative view of 
democracy is offered by Tilly (1995), who provides a series of images of democracy that 
represent the way researchers have studied democratization.  At one extreme, democracy 
is an oilfield; at the other, it is a cultivated garden.  An oilfield develops over millennia 
through a series of rare coincidences.  A scientist may be able to theorize about where an 
untapped oilfield is likely to be found, and she is also able to explain how an oil well 
works.  Such an expert, however, is incapable of producing a new oilfield at will.  At the 
other pole is the image of a garden.  Not all environments are equally hospitable to 
cultivating a thriving garden, but there are many varieties of environments that produce 
different types of gardens, as long as they are nourished by sufficient sun, precipitation, 
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and appropriate soil.  A botanist, like the oilfield expert, is able to explain how the garden 
works, but the garden is amenable to intervention in ways that an oilfield is not because it 
is not the rare product of the ages. 
 Tilly finds both of these conceptualizations of democracy to be inadequate 
because “no one has so far succeeded in separating common correlates of democratic 
arrangements from non-tautologically necessary, sufficient, or contingently causal 
conditions” (1995:381).  This problem persists because democracy, he argues, is a lake.  
Lakes form in many ways (manmade, melting glaciers, etc.), but once a lake exists, it has 
characteristic properties—particular ecosystems, for example.  Tilly uses this metaphor to 
make a theoretical point: studying particular cases of democratization can, at most, 
provide us with a set of possible paths to democracy, some sufficient (but not necessary) 
conditions for transition, and an understanding of the mechanisms that maintain 
democratic institutions once they are formed. 
It follows that there must be some common feature of democracy, some 
mechanism, that promotes lustration regardless of how a country transitions to 
democracy. While the analysis presented in this chapter cannot offer such a mechanism, I 
can offer one possible explanation that arises from my case studies: policy feedback. My 
analyses of Croatia and Serbia, presented in chapters 4 and 5, show that a country’s 
history of regulating and using its security sector constrain and condition future options 
for further regulation. The constraining effects of policy feedback are likely to be 
stronger in democratic rather than autocratic states, as the former is explicitly designed 
with mechanisms to limit the power of its decision makers. 
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In closing, I will suggest future directions for quantitative research on lustration. 
Cross-national comparative studies of lustration should examine the extent to which 
lustration laws are enforced. Some, particularly the early adopters, pursue lustration quite 
vigorously, with many thousands of persons screened and lengthy disqualifications meted 
out. Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Estonia are examples of such cases. Other countries 
with lustration laws, like Poland, have taken a more moderate approach. One obstacle to 
this kind of research is that there does not seem to be high quality data that is publicly 
available on enforcement—such as the number of people screened and the number of 
people found to be lustration-positive in a given year—for most countries. Macedonia 
provides such data on a website,26 but cross-national quantitative studies will require 
access to the records of national or local lustration commissions, particularly if features 
of the screened persons are to be taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 www.kvf.org.mk 
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Appendix 2.1: List of First Lustration Laws in Post-Communist States 
 
1990 Germany  “Germany Unification Treaty” 
 
1991 Czechoslovakia “Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Screening Law  
no. 451/4” 
 
1991 Lithuania  “Decree Banning KGB Employees and Informers from  
Government Positions no. 418” 
 
1992 Bulgaria  “Law on Banks and Credit Activity” 
 
1994 Hungary  “Act XXIII on the Screening of Holders of Some  
Important Positions, Holders of Positions of Public Trust, 
and Opinion-Leading Public Figures” 
 
1994 Latvia   “The Election Law on City and Town Councils, District  
Councils, and Pagasts Councils” 
 
1995 Albania  “Law on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity  
Committed During the Communist Regime for Political, 
Ideological, and Religious Motives” 
 
1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia  
and Herzegovina” (aka “Dayton Accords”) 
 
1995 Czech Republic “Act No. 254/1995, Amending the Large Lustration Act” 
 
1995 Estonia  “Citizenship Law” 
 
1997 Poland   “Lustration Law” 
 
2002 Slovak Republic “Law on National Memory” 
 
2003 Serbia   “Law on Accountability for Human Rights Violations” 
 
2006 Romania  “Emergency Ordinance No. 16, Amending Law No. 187  
of 1999 on Access to One’s Own File and the Unveiling of 
the Securitate As a Political Police” 
 
2008 Macedonia  "Law on Additional Requirements for Public Office" 
 
2011 Georgia  “Freedom Charter” 
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Chapter 3. 
The Diffusion of Lustration Laws: An Exercise in Theory Revision 
 
 
“What’s past is prologue” 
William Shakespeare, The Tempest Act II, scene i 
 
Introduction 
Lustration policies have received much scholarly attention for their perceived 
utility as instruments of rehabilitation, retribution, truth revelation, and trust building in 
the post-Communist states (Letki 2002; Horne and Levi 2003; Mayer-Reickh and de 
Greiff 2007; Stan 2008; Horne 2012; Choi and David 2012). Despite these supposed 
benefits, the implementation of lustration has been met with skepticism, uneasiness, and 
opposition from many international actors, who view lustration proceedings variously as 
a smear tactic used for political revenge, a witch hunt based on secretive evidence of 
questionable veracity, or an impediment to democratic elections, among other objections. 
Despite the misgivings of many international institutions and their repeated efforts to 
establish acceptable parameters for lustration, the practice has dominated as the primary 
method of transitional justice in Eastern Europe. Since 1989, lustration has been 
proposed, if not adopted, by legislators from most post-Communist states (see Table 2.1 
in the previous chapter). 
This chapter addresses the question of how laws to cleanse the public sector of 
secret police agents and collaborators have diffused throughout post-Communist Eastern 
Europe. I argue that this phenomenon challenges the theory of policy diffusion put 
forward by John Meyer and colleagues, who propose that a common world culture, 
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disseminated through international organizations, explains such diffusion in the post-
World War II era. This theory, known as world polity neoinstitutionalism (WPN),27 seeks 
to explain how global models and discourses diffuse to nation-states. The theory does 
not, however, account for how a phenomenon diffuses in spite of its incongruence with 
such models and discourses. 
The diffusion of lustration, then, is a paradox when refracted against the extant 
neoinstitutionalist literature. This chapter explores the paradox by first briefly outlining 
the main concepts and arguments of WPN. Then, I review the stance of the relevant, 
significant international actors toward lustration as a practice that must be tightly 
corralled, and contrast that insistence on regulation with states’ often unrestrained 
implementation of lustration policies. I argue that, despite this discrepancy, concepts 
from world polity neoinstitutionalism can nevertheless be employed to account for 
lustration’s diffusion when the theory is revised and complemented with concepts from 
the sociology of culture, social movements, and comparative law. 
 
World Polity Neoinstitutionalism: An Overview 
World polity neoinstitutionalism is a theoretical perspective developed initially by 
sociologist John Meyer at Stanford University. In contrast to the many social theories 
whose insights are geared toward explaining differences across groups, categories, time, 
or place, WPN is a theory of sameness.  In the 1970s, Meyer noticed that schools in sub-
Saharan Africa had begun to model themselves on Western educational systems. This 
                                                
27 The theory is sometimes known as “world society theory,” but I find the term polity, with its connotation 
of power, to be more precise. 
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observation belied prevailing theories of the day, such as modernization theory and 
world-systems theory, which suggested that educational systems would be of a form 
more closely tied to the needs of the labor market in a given location. Meyer developed 
WPN in response to the shortcomings of other perspectives by focusing on culture and 
phenomenology, rather than economics and functionalism (Meyer et al. 1997).  In short, 
WPN was developed as an alternative theory of globalization that filled an analytical gap 
by providing a framework for explaining the isomorphic tendencies of nation-states, 
particularly in the period since World War II. 
 WPN argues that culture is an engine of globalization that provides norms, 
supplies scripts, and generates cognitive models, all of which are used to guide the 
behavior of nation-states (Meyer 2010). Consider briefly the decision-making process of 
liberal democratic societies as an example to illustrate these concepts. Norms are rules 
that govern behavior in a given setting. In a liberal democracy, it is normative for citizens 
to be able to decide who will form a government in their name (or, in some countries, in 
the sovereign’s name). A script provides the recipe by which this norm is achieved. In the 
liberal democratic context, the decision about who governs is made via an election, with 
its attendant properties of regular- or fixed-interval recurrence, multi-party participation, 
universal adult suffrage, and full accounting of votes cast. Finally, cognitive models are 
shared mental frameworks that provide the blueprint for enacting a script. They tell us, in 
this case, what an election looks like. Elections of a large scale in liberal democracies are 
usually conducted at multiple sites and rely on some version of a secret ballot procedure, 
rather than on another polling method, such as acclamation. 
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WPN posits as its central premise that a common global culture that influences 
the behavior of nation-states has been forged over the past several decades (Boli and 
Thomas 1999). The theory argues that the essential elements of this culture—its norms, 
scripts, and cognitive models—are promulgated through intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). In the case of 
elections, IGOs, such as the Organization for American States, the European Union, and 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and INGOs, such as the Carter 
Center and the National Democratic Institute, regularly engage in democratic capacity 
building, political party development, and election monitoring. They observe the conduct 
and process of elections, particularly in emerging democracies, to assess whether a given 
election meets international standards (Santa Cruz 2005). 
IGOs and INGOs constitute the “polity” in world polity neoinstitutionalism. The 
imprimatur of such organizations gives the appearance of consensus and universality 
around policies, thereby conferring legitimacy on the policies and on the states that adopt 
them. IGOs and INGOs convey to national governments what they believe to be 
appropriate models not only of decision-making, but also of environmental protections, 
human rights policies, market deregulation, and more. Arguments about the capacities of 
IGOs and INGOs to transmit a global culture have been articulated in abundant detail 
(Krucken and Drori 2009; Schofer et al 2010; Schofer and Longhofer 2011) and have 
been buttressed by copious illustrative application to a range of cross-nationally diffusive 
phenomena, such as anti-female genital cutting laws (Boyle 2002), civil war (Hironaka 
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2005), geological science (Schofer 2003), and educational curricula (Meyer and Ramirez 
2000).  
 
The Lustration Paradox 
International institutions and organizations have rigidly defined the boundaries of 
what constitutes an acceptable lustration system by international standards and have 
repeatedly determined that lustration policies, in practice, routinely exceed those limits. 
In general, the international legal objections to lustration’s excesses fall into the 
following four categories: information problems, particularly those resulting from a 
reliance on secret police dossiers28; due process violations; employment discrimination; 
and bureaucratic loyalty concerns (Horne 2009). The official pronouncements of 
individual organizations on the parameters of lustration merit further exposition, but I 
shall begin this section by first reviewing a single, prominent legal case (Matyjek v. 
Poland 2007) in which some of the problematic tendencies of lustration are illustrated. 
 
The Matyjek case—the right to a fair trial 
                                                
28 The problems associated with the secret police files are numerous. There are concerns regarding the 
truthfulness of the information contained within, the lack of potentially mitigating information about 
circumstances under which named informants collaborated with the secret police (coercion, threats, and 
blackmail of informants is often not noted in the files), the completeness of the files (many were destroyed 
in the waning days of Communism or since), their continued classification in some countries as state 
secrets—leaving many accused persons ignorant of the evidence tying them to the secret police, and the 
availability of enough files to conduct a thorough lustration process (Verdery 2009; Nalepa 2010). The last 
point is especially a problem in newly independent states. For example, many of the Yugoslav secret police 
files were held in Belgrade, the federal capital of Yugoslavia. Now that Macedonia, a former republic of 
Yugoslavia, has instigated lustration, it would like access to relevant files on Macedonians that remain in 
Belgrade. Currently, Macedonia has access only to those files that were left behind in its capital city, 
Skopje. Belgrade, now the capital of an independent Serbia, has not been willing to share classified files 
with another state—even one that used to be part of Yugoslavia. Thus, evidence of an explanatory or even 
exculpatory nature is denied to lustration applicants in Macedonia. Similar problems have arisen involving 
the lustration systems in the Baltic States, with many KGB files still being housed in Moscow. 
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 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), established in 1959, is the 
judicial arm of the Council of Europe (CoE). Located in Strasbourg, France, the Court 
hears cases to determine whether its 47 member states are meeting their obligations under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).29 Similar to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR operates on a state, rather than individual, and civil, 
rather than criminal, model of accountability (Sikkink 2009). States found to have 
violated the Convention could be forced to pay damages to applicants. The ECtHR is a 
court of last resort, meaning that applicants must first exhaust all domestic remedies for 
their grievances before seeking a judgment from Strasbourg. 
 It is under such circumstances that Mr. Tadeusz Matyjek, a member of the lower 
house of Poland’s parliament (the Sejm), alleged in 2003 that the lustration proceedings 
to which he had been subjected30 were unfair and violated Article 6 of the ECHR. Article 
6 establishes the right to a fair trial, including a presumption of innocence and certain 
other “minimum rights,” like the right to examine accusing witnesses (ECHR 1950). 
Under the terms of Poland’s 1997 Lustration Act, Matyjek and other members of 
                                                
29 The previous chapter showed that ratification of the ECHR to have a positive bivariate relationship to the 
proposal of lustration bills. I argue that, under the propositions of WPN, the opposite should be the case. 
30 Poland’s lustration system is unique among those of the post-Communist states in that it punishes not the 
act of collaboration with the secret police, but instead punishes lying about such collaboration. The 1997 
Lustration Act requires those subject to it, such as candidates for and members of the parliament, to declare 
whether they were collaborators with—or members of—the Polish Security Service (Slużba 
Bezpieczeństwa, or “SB”). Unlike the lustration systems of other countries, persons in Poland who confess 
to collaboration with the SB are not banned from public office. Rather, their admission is made public, and 
the electorate does with this information what it will. Only persons who are found to have lied about their 
collaboration are punished. A person who claims not to have been a collaborator, but is determined after 
investigation into the SB’s dossiers to have been a collaborator, is banned from public office for 10 years 
(Czarnota 2007; Choi and David 2012). It is in this way that, in my view, Poland’s lustration law is, 
perversely, both the most Stalinist and the most liberal-democratic of laws in the region. It is Stalinist in its 
insistence on confession, even in cases when the “evidence” of collaboration is deeply problematic; it is 
liberal-democratic in that confession does not prohibit one from standing for election or holding other 
public office. 
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parliament were required to disclose whether they had served in or worked for the secret 
police (SB) between 1944 and 1990; Matyjek declared that he had not. In 1999, Matyjek 
was accused by the Commissioner of the Public Interest of having lied about his 
collaboration. In December of that year, the Warsaw Court of Appeals found that 
Matyjek “had been a deliberate and secret collaborator with the Security Service” and 
had lied in his declaration (p. 2). Part of the evidence that the Warsaw court relied on was 
testimony that Matyjek’s signature was found on his secret police file, but this evidence, 
given its classification as a state secret, was not available to Matyjek. Matyjek appealed, 
claiming that he did not know he had been registered as a collaborator. He requested to 
have testimony entered from the SB agent who had allegedly recruited Matyjek, but that 
agent was deceased.  Several further appeals were lodged in Polish courts, but they were 
unsuccessful. In February 2000, Matyjek was relieved of his seat in parliament and 
barred from standing for election, or from holding other public offices, for 10 years. 
 The ECtHR was sympathetic to Matyjek’s claims and ruled that Poland had gone 
beyond what was acceptable in the implementation of its lustration law. In its opinion, the 
ECtHR (2007:17-18) wrote: 
… [The Court] reiterates that if a state is to adopt lustration measures, it must 
ensure that the persons affected thereby enjoy all procedural guarantees under the 
Convention in respect of any proceedings relating to the application of such 
measures. … 
 
…the Court considers that due to the confidentiality of the documents, … the 
applicant's ability to prove that the contacts he had had with the communist-era 
secret services did not amount to “intentional and secret collaboration” within the 
meaning of the Lustration Act were severely curtailed. … 
 
In these circumstances the Court concludes that the lustration proceedings against 
the applicant, taken as a whole, cannot be considered as fair within the meaning of 
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Article 6 § 1 of the Convention taken together with Article 6 § 3. There has 
accordingly been a breach of those provisions. 
 
The ECtHR’s holdings in the Matyjek case are but one instance in a line of jurisprudence 
that has sought to reign in the excesses of Eastern Europe’s lustration processes. In 
addition to violations of Article 6 of the ECHR, other court cases have found there to be 
violations of the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), the right to 
freedom of expression (Article 10), the right to freedom of assembly and association 
(Article 11), the right to an effective remedy (Article 13), the prohibition of 
discrimination (Article 14), and the right to free elections (Protocol 1, Article 3). In every 
case brought before the ECtHR through 2008, the Court found lustration to have been 
implemented in a way that is inconsistent with the Convention, and has ruled in favor of 
the lustrated person31 (Horne 2009). But the ECtHR is not the only international actor to 
reach this conclusion. Other actors have also determined that, in their efforts to navigate a 
course between the Scylla of permitting impunity for past human rights violations and the 
Charybdis of committing further human rights violations, states with lustration policies 
have repeatedly veered toward the latter. 
 
The Council of Europe 
In addition to the ECtHR, other international governmental organizations have 
weighed in on lustration. In 1996, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
issued Resolution 1096, detailing its position “on measures to dismantle the heritage of 
                                                
31 This uniformity is particularly striking given the ECtHR’s tendency to rule against states with unique 
policies that place them outside the consensus of the rest of Europe (Boyle and Meyer 1998), rather than 
against states with policies as widespread as lustration. 
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former communist totalitarian systems.” The resolution does not require states to adopt 
lustration laws. Rather, it stresses that when such laws are adopted, as eight states had 
done at the time of its issuance, they must conform to certain democratic standards. These 
criteria were spelled out in a separate document and state that “revenge may never be a 
goal of such laws, nor should political or social misuse of the resulting lustration process be 
allowed” (CoE 1996). The document, included as Appendix A, then lists 13 specific 
requirements for lustration laws. Many of these guidelines are routinely violated. For 
example, Guideline E, which prohibits lustration for elective office, is violated in the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, and Macedonia. Guideline G, which 
limits bans from office to 5 years and sets an expiration date of December 31, 1999, has 
been violated by all countries with lustration systems. 
Despite the clarity of the CoE resolutions that they do not confer a duty to lustrate, 
they have been deployed as the sine qua non of lustration by at least one state. The website 
of Macedonia's lustration body, known as the Data Verification Commission, states that the 
"obligation"32 to adopt a lustration law arises from Resolution 1096. Thus, a resolution that 
was intended as an effort to reign in lustration systems for states that chose to adopt them 
has been misinterpreted as an order compelling states to implement lustration. It is not clear 
whether this is a deliberate or unintentional misreading of the CoE resolution, but the 12-
year interval between the adoption of the resolution in 1996 and the passage of Macedonia's 
first lustration law in 2008 suggests that the supposed obligation was not felt with a great 
deal of urgency and instead operates as a post hoc justification. 
                                                
32	  "обврската"	  (http://www.kvf.org.mk/index.php/mk/2012-­‐11-­‐15-­‐10-­‐08-­‐40)	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As with the ECHR, the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Convention No. 
111 on Discrimination in the Workplace is a treaty that limits the reach of lustration 
systems. Persons seeking legal remedy through this treaty make application to the ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, an 
organ of the United Nations. As with the ECtHR, every case brought before the ILO 
regarding lustration has been decided in favor of the applicant. The ILO Committee of 
Experts has held that states do have a right to screen for loyalty, but has found in every 
lustration case brought before it that the state has, in practice, exceeded its rights in this 
regard (Horne 2009). The ILO has issued Comments stating that lustration, by banning 
persons from holding certain jobs, violates the prohibition on employment discrimination. 
Similar to the ECtHR, the ILO finds fault with the information used to make 
determinations about one’s status as a collaborator—that is, the secret police dossiers. 
The ILO’s opposition to lustration was evident in the early post-Communist years, 
even before official challenges to the laws were brought before it. On March 5, 1992, the 
ILO’s Governing Body issued an opinion on the then-recently adopted Czechoslovakian 
lustration law, writing, 
The Committee set up under article 24 of the Constitution examined the 
compatibility with the Convention of Act No. 451/1991 of 4 October 1991, 
known as the "Screening Act" [i.e., the lustration law], with respect to exclusions 
of specified categories of persons from a wide range of functions and occupations, 
mostly in public institutions but also in the private sector. People liable to such 
exclusions include persons who were engaged in the past in specified functions, 
or were associated with or members of specified bodies or organisations of the 
former political system, in a period of over 40 years from 25 February 1948 to 12 
November 1989. 
The Committee was of the view that the exclusions established by Act No. 
451/1991 may be deemed inherent requirements of particular jobs and therefore 
  48 
admissible under Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Convention only in a certain 
number of cases. It further found that the exclusions under the Act cannot be 
regarded as measures concerning activities prejudicial to the security of the State 
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention [No. 111]. It therefore was 
bound to conclude that, to the extent indicated, the exclusions imposed by Act 
No. 451/1991 constitute discrimination on the basis of political opinion under 
the terms of the Convention. It also found that the appeals procedures under Act 
No. 451/1991 did not fully meet the requirements of the Convention. (ILO 1992, 
emphasis added) 
 
The ILO further called on the Czechoslovakian government to “repeal or modify any 
legal provisions which are incompatible with the Convention [No. 111].” 
 
International Non-Governmental Organizations 
Like the ILO, the influential INGO Human Rights Watch was derisive of the 1991 
Czechoslovakian lustration law—the first such law to receive widespread international 
attention. Then known as Helsinki Watch, the organization wrote in a 1993 report on 
human rights in Czechoslovakia, 
In the view of Helsinki Watch, the Czechoslovakian government and the 
Constitutional Court should repeal the lustration law. … Helsinki Watch is 
concerned that with respect to past violations of human rights, persons are not 
charged with having violated a particular law or standard, but instead are being 
persecuted merely for having belonged to a now-discredited group. 
 
The report concludes with the suggestion that Czechoslovakia should reject lustration and 
instead pursue a truth commission or criminal prosecutions, indicating the international 
consensus for those transitional justice mechanisms over vetting procedures. 
 On January 1, 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully dissolved into two separate 
nations—the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. The 1991 lustration law, adopted 
when there was still one Czechoslovakia, was inherited by both successor states. Only the 
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Czech Republic, however, continued to enforce the law. In 1995, with the law set to 
expire the following year in both countries, the Czech Republic renewed the law for a 
further four years (and ultimately extended the law indefinitely), while the Slovak 
Republic allowed the law to expire quietly (Nedelsky 2004; Priban 2007) before adopting 
its own lustration law in 2002. 
In its 1996 report on the Czech Republic, which had recently renewed its 
lustration law for the first time, Human Rights Watch repeated its earlier position.  
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki is concerned that persons prosecuted under the 
lustration law are not being prosecuted for acts that were criminal at the time they 
were committed, but for having belonged to a now-discredited group. 
 
Another prominent INGO, Amnesty International, has, by its own admission, 
issued “virtually no” reports on lustration. I interpret Amnesty’s relative silence on 
lustration as further evidence that lustration does not have support in the INGO 
community. The one report that does exist was issued by the Dutch affiliate of AI in 
2006. The report, anodyne by Amnesty International’s standards, summarized the status 
of lustration laws in Central Europe, but advocated neither for nor against their 
implementation.  For example, of Serbia the report indicates: 
A lustration law was passed, the ‘Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
Act’, in May 2003. It applies to all human rights violations that occurred after 23 
March 1976, the day that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
came into effect. The overall number of affected persons is unknown. The 
Commission for Investigation of Accountability for Human Rights Violations has 
nine members. Three members are judges of the Supreme Court of Serbia, three 
members are prominent legal experts, one member is a deputy public prosecutor 
of the Republic of Serbia and two members are deputies of the National Assembly 
holding a degree in law, elected from different electoral lists. 
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Accurate as this concise summary of the Serbian lustration law and its implementing 
body may be, no indication is given of Amnesty’s attitude toward the law. Unlike Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty is not applying negative pressure on states to avoid lustration; 
but Amnesty is not promoting lustration, either. 
 
Resolving the Paradox by Reformulating WPN 
 
Working in the tradition of Burawoy’s (1991) extended case method, which sees 
the exploration of anomalous cases as the key avenue for revising and improving theories 
(Shor 2008), I argue that the paradox I have developed thus far can be used for 
reconstructing WPN theory. Burawoy describes the method as follows,  
We begin with our favorite theory but seek not confirmations but refutations that 
inspire us to deepen that theory. Instead of discovering grounded theory we 
elaborate existing theory. We do not worry about the uniqueness of our case since 
we are not as interested in its ‘representativeness’ as its contribution to 
‘reconstructing’ theory” (1998:16).  
 
Although the current formulations of WPN are unable to account for the diffusion 
of lustration laws, the theory can be revised in such a way as to accommodate the special 
situation engendered by the case of lustration. In the sections that follow, I introduce the 
concepts of legal constraint structure and schematic antecedent to demonstrate their 
utility in reformulating WPN. Drawing on the work of comparative legal scholars, I 
suggest that prestige, rather than consensus and universality, can be an alternative source 
of legitimacy that leads to diffusion when coupled with mimetic bridging. 
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Rewriting the Script 
 
WPN scholars often make use of the concept of legal origin. This concept is used 
to denote the type of legal system employed by a particular country. The simplest 
categorization of legal origins is into those countries governed by common law versus 
those governed by civil law.33 Such a division is often a marker of a country’s colonial 
history: common law systems are prevalent in England, Wales, and former British 
colonies, whereas civil law systems are prevalent in continental Europe and its former 
colonies. Research has found that legal diffusion is common among countries that share 
the same legal origin (Spamann 2009; Goderis and Versteeg 2013). While a shared legal 
origin may provide avenues that enable the borrowing of laws, it is equally important to 
understand the ways that legal systems may close off other, possibly more preferable, 
avenues of legal action. 
To make this point, I build on and expand the concept of “political opportunity 
structures” to include its ontological other—that is, constraint. Political opportunity 
structure is a concept used by social movement scholars to describe both the relative 
openness of political systems to change/be changed and their capacity to resist change, 
the stability/instability of political alignments, the availability of strategic partners, and 
the potential for exploitation of conflicts among political elites (Tarrow 1983, 1989; 
McAdam 1999). Building on this idea, Andersen (2004) introduced the term “legal 
opportunity structure” to analyze the way that social change—in his case, the 
advancement of gay rights—can be achieved through litigation. For my purposes, I focus 
                                                
33 Civil law systems are characterized by their reliance on codification. Common law systems, by contrast, 
are based on the principle of stare decisis, which gives primacy to precedent as a source of law Shapiro 
(1981). 
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not on opportunities, but on constraint. By constraint, I refer to the limits of possible 
change. Constraint is not conceptually the same as a low level of opportunity because, as 
I conceive it, it applies not only to persons agitating on the outside of a system of power, 
but also to persons working within a system of power.34 Thus, I use the term legal 
constraint structure35 to describe the legal predicament encountered by many East 
European countries when it comes to holding persons accountable for human rights 
abuses committed under Communism.  
Before the imposition of single-party Communist rule, the nations of Eastern 
Europe, as with the rest of continental Europe, had legal systems based in civil law. In the 
Communist countries, civil law was replaced with socialist law36, which sought to abolish 
private property rights and, importantly for the case of lustration, allowed great latitude in 
the power of the secret police (Sypnowich 1990). Socialist law was characterized by an 
                                                
34 Prudence, if not the arbiters of authoritative sociological claims-making themselves, compels further 
explication of this concept beyond the immediate case at hand (i.e., lustration), so I will provide an example 
that continues the reasoning begun by Andersen (2004). When litigants are able to achieve the vindication 
of gay rights through a court system, then they are operating within a legal opportunity structure best 
described as permissive. If one imagines, conversely, a legal system that does not countenance such remedy 
because, for example, it does not grant locus standi to persons of unorthodox erotic predilection to bring 
claims against the state, then one is contending with a legal opportunity structure that can most charitably 
be designated as tyrannous. This hypothetical legal system, however unyielding, does not, in my conceptual 
formulation, represent a legal constraint structure. Rather, a legal constraint structure vis-à-vis gay rights is 
better illustrated by the circumstances borne by the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama, at least 
through early 2013. The administration would have preferred to extend federal legal recognition of same-
sex marriage to persons contracted into such unions as defined by the laws of certain states, but was unable 
to do so because of the 1996 law known as the “Defense of Marriage Act.” This law constrained those with 
executive power, even as the less politically powerful litigants took advantage of the United States’ 
permissive legal opportunity structure to challenge DOMA at the Supreme Court. Thus, in the present 
framework, constraint and opportunity structures are analytically distinct and not mere inversions of one 
another.  
35 One might argue that by my concept of legal constraint I am merely invoking what is sometimes termed 
the rule of law (see, for example, Uzelac 2007, who makes a similar point). I do not find that term to be 
useful, though, because it is too capacious and, as such, is a tool easily wielded by the political class.	  
36 Many legal scholars consider socialist law to be a variant of civil law rather than an altogether different 
legal system. I wish not to enter that debate. For my purposes, I want to establish that socialist law is 
different enough from (other types of) civil law so as to trigger the applicability of nullum crimen. 
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"obsessive secrecy" in which legislation was published "for internal use only" (Loeber 
1970) and distributed, if at all, on a "need-to-know" basis (Markovits 2006). Thus, in 
Western views, socialist law was "state-serving and contemptuous of individual rights, 
ignorant of due process, ranking collective over person interest, subservient to the Party, 
and administered by a distrusted and pliable judiciary" (Markovits 2007:237). 
When state socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe, so, too, did most aspects of 
socialist law. The post-Communist states reverted to legal systems based in civil law, 
often adopting what political scientist Kim Scheppele (2004) refers to as "not-like-that 
constitutions." These codifications were meant to establish a secure rule of law that 
eschewed the pernicious aspects of their socialist, and sometimes Stalinist, predecessor 
systems. 
It is the replacement of socialist law with civil law that results in the 
aforementioned legal constraint structure for the post-Communist states. A foundational 
principle of civil law systems is expressed by the Latin phrase nullum crimen sine lege—
that is, there is no crime without a law37. Because socialist law was, by its nature, 
repressive, most of what may be regarded by the collective memory as the “crimes” of 
the secret police were not illegal at the time they were committed.38 This fact has 
severely restricted the ability of East European states to seek accountability through 
                                                
37 The principle is also enshrined in Article 7 of the ECHR. It states in part, “No one shall be held guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under 
national or international law at the time when it was committed.” 
38 There are exceptions—for example, assassinations, which were illegal, particularly when carried out in 
the West. Even those kinds of prosecutions, though, are sometimes hampered by concerns about the statute 
of limitations (Uzelac 2007; Bumin 2010). See the following chapter for a discussion of the controversy 
around the Croatian secret police regarding assassinations they carried out in West Germany and France. 
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prosecutions in the criminal justice system (Bruce 2008).39 A Serbian NGO project 
designed to investigate and determine best practices for dealing with the past in that 
country summarized the region-wide problem and the decision to pursue lustration, rather 
than prosecution, as follows: 
The limited options for criminal punishment … apply in the end to the heads of 
the regime and a limited number of their closest associates who have severely 
violated human rights. … It is, however, well known that the planning, 
organization and application of repression in communist and other totalitarian 
regimes is based on the participation of a large number of institutions and 
employees of these regimes (Milosavljevic and Pavicevic 2002:101). 
 
 
Portugal, an early adopter of transitional justice, provides a useful contrast to the 
East European experience and illustrates what can be achieved in the absence of such 
legal constraints. A right-wing authoritarian regime ruled Portugal from 1933 to 1974, a 
period known as the Estado Novo. When junior military officers staged a 1974 coup to 
restore democracy, they unknowingly launched an expansive global episode of 
democratization that spread out from Portugal through Southern Europe, Latin America, 
                                                
39 Hungary’s Constitutional Court thwarted early attempts at prosecutions in that country. Decision No. 
11/1992 struck down “An Act Concerning the Right to Prosecute Serious Criminal Offences committed 
between 21 December 1944 and 2 May 1990 that Had Not Been Prosecuted for Political Reasons of 4 
November 1991” (Bumin 2010). In early 2013, the government of Hungary, formed by the Fidesz political 
party, after a series of Constitutional Court rulings that did not go in their favor, attempted to push through 
a 15-page series of constitutional amendments that, among other power-grabbing interventions, violates the 
nullum crimen principle. Scheppele described the amendment as a "toxic waste dump of bad constitutional 
ideas." She added, "The amendment also announces as a constitutional fact that the communist party and its 
associated groups were 'criminal organizations.' Those who were associated [with] them are now 
responsible for a long list of offenses including maintaining the regime, betraying the nation, ending 
freedom of property, putting the country into debt, depriving citizens of human rights, and undermining 
national identity" (2013). The response of the international community to these changes has been swift and 
unsubtle. The U.S. State Department says the amendments "could threaten the principles of institutional 
independence and checks and balances that are the hallmark of democratic governance" (Nuland 2013). 
The CoE Secretary General issued a statement saying, in part, "I am concerned about the compatibility of 
the constitutional amendments with the principle of the rule of law, as set out in the Statute of the Council 
of Europe" (Holtgen 2013). He further called on Hungary to delay the vote on the amendments. This 
incident illustrates the international policing of legal constraint structures and the seriousness with which 
they are taken. 
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and ultimately Eastern Europe (Markoff 2005). Having retained its civil law system 
throughout the Estado Novo, Portugal found itself unchecked by the nullum crimen 
principle of civil law and thus was able to put members of its secret police, the PIDE, on 
trial for their crimes qua crimes (Raimundo 2007; Sikkink 2011). 
 
Resonance of Historical Precursors 
 
To this point, I have argued that international community’s preferred script for 
enacting the norm of accountability for human rights violations is criminal prosecution, 
but that such action cannot be taken in most cases in Eastern Europe due to legal 
constraints. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to an alternate script—some other means of 
achieving accountability. The case of lustration suggests that such substitute scripts, not 
sanctioned by the world polity, are sought in the familiar and are based on past 
experiences. Here, borrowing again from social movement scholars, the concept of frame 
resonance is useful. Resonance denotes the ways in which ideas gain traction with an 
audience by mechanisms such as the credibility of the claims-maker and the extent to 
which the idea/arguments comport with the audience’s own lived experience (Snow and 
Benford 2000). To understand the diffusion of lustration in the East European context, we 
have to ask why this particular method of transitional justice resonates broadly as an 
alternative to the more acceptable script of criminal prosecution. In accordance with the 
observation made by the dramatist Shakespeare that "what's past is prologue," I argue that 
this resonance is due in large part to the collective memory of what I term lustration’s 
schematic antecedent: the purge. 
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 Before commencing with a genealogical analysis of lustration, it is productive to 
engage first in an etymological analysis of the term. Lustration derives from the Latin 
verb lustrare, meaning "to purify by a propitiatory offering" (OED 1989). In ancient 
Greece and Rome, lustration was a process "whereby individuals or communities rid 
themselves of ceremonial impurity ... [such as] pollution incurred by contact with 
childbirth or with a corpse" (Encylopædia Britannica 2013).  Purification was achieved 
with fumigation and application of water, blood, clay, or other substances. More 
proximately, the term lustration was appropriated by the Czechs (lustrace), who retained 
the original meaning of purification or cleansing, but extended its application to the state. 
As described by Milosavljevic and Pavicevic (2002:104), “By using this term, perhaps 
the Czechs wanted to emphasize the ethical, sublime dimension of freeing themselves 
from the communist past.” 
 But the Czech usage of lustrace did not begin with post-Communist debates about 
the need to cleanse the state of human rights abusers. Instead, the term was used by the 
Czechoslovakian secret police (StB, Státní bezpečnost) to refer to their process of 
evaluating citizens' loyalty to the Communist Party (Horne and Levi 2003; Barret, Hack, 
and Munkacsi 2007). The post-Communist concept of lustration as a screening procedure 
is thus only very slightly removed from the screenings of citizens that were already 
taking place before the reinstatement of democracy. 
 Yet another precursor of post-Communist lustration is the purge of Nazis and 
other régime critics that followed World War II. Nazi collaborators and critics of 
Communism were hunted down by many countries under the pretext of consolidating the 
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newly installed Communist regimes. Such purges were accompanied by Stalinist show 
trials that enabled Communists to silence dissent and settle scores with critics and other 
Party members alike (Stan 2008). High-profile examples include the trials of Traicho 
Kostov in Bulgaria, László Rajk in Hungary, Rudolf Slánský and 13 other Communist 
leaders in Czechoslovakia, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu in Romania, and Leo Bauer in East 
Germany--all of whom were Communist Party leaders (Hodos 1987). Further examples 
include the 1968 "anti-Zionist" purge of 9,000 Jews from official positions in Poland (AP 
1988) and the 1971-72 purge of Croatian separatists by Tito in Yugoslavia (Biondich  
2005). 
“Terror and purges are essential ingredients” of any Communist state, observes 
Vali (1984:175; cf. Brzezinski 1956). This fact was evident throughout Central Europe in 
the late 1940s. The Hungarian secret police, the AVH, had many duties: espionage, the 
surveillance of foreigners, and arrests and interrogations of political prisoners, to name a 
few. Paramount among their responsibilities was keeping a watchful eye on all organs of 
the Hungarian Communist Party, including the Central Committee. The AVH conducted 
purges even from within the upper echelons of the Party. The most well known case was 
the purging of Minister of the Interior Laszlo Rajk. In August 1948, Rajk was demoted to 
the less prestigious post of Minister of Foreign Affairs (Vali 1984). The timing of his 
removal from office was no coincidence, as it came shortly after a significant dispute 
between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Energy-poor Yugoslavia felt its bilateral trade agreements with the Soviet Union 
were asymmetric, benefitting the latter while exploiting the former (Allcock 2000). Tito 
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had been vocal for years about his rejection of an imperialist relationship with Moscow, 
preferring instead a partnership that placed Yugoslavia and the other allies on equal 
footing with the Soviet Union. Tensions reached their peak in 1948, and Yugoslavia was 
expelled from the Cominform, the cross-national organization of Communist parties 
(Gallagher 2001). 
Thus, Laszlo Rajk’s removal from office by Hungarian General Secretary Matyas 
Rakosi was done so that Hungary could curry favor with Moscow at a time when the 
Soviet Union’s alliances were beginning to strain. After a Stalinist-style show-trial in 
which Rajk “confessed” that he and Tito had been plotting to overthrow the Hungarian 
Communist regime, Rajk was sentenced to death. Although Rajk thought he was only 
playing a role—letting himself be made an example of—and would be sent to live a new 
life in the Soviet Union, he was in fact hanged. Rajk is just one of many purge victims by 
the Rakosi regime in Hungary. Many thousands of political prisoners were taken under 
his reign, and at least 2,000 were executed like Rajk (Vali 1984). 
Czechoslovakia was put under similar pressure to distance itself from Tito and to 
demonstrate its loyalty to the Soviet Union after Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the 
Cominform. Like Hungary, Czechoslovkia needed a fall guy. They found that person in 
Slovak party leader Rudolph Slansky, who became the “Czechoslovakian Rajk.” Slansky 
and other Jews were particularly targeted in the purges, indicating an ethnic bias in the 
Czechoslovak case, but Jews were not the only targets of the regime. Nearly 10,000 
people were imprisoned for crimes against the state by 1950 (Rice 1984). Slansky was 
charged with “cosmopolitanism” and “Zionism.” He and 13 other defendants were given 
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a show trial—the script having been approved by Stalin himself—where they begged for 
the death penalty. Slansky and ten others were hanged; the other three defendants were 
given life in prison (Rosenberg 1995). 
There is, therefore, a long history in the region of removing from office important 
officials whose loyalty or ideological alignment with the state was questionable, or which 
could be questioned for the purposes of political gain. For this reason, I argue that 
lustration has a special resonance in the post-Communist states, more so than in other 
world regions who lack this prior experience, and exists as an available schematic device 
for the current regimes in Central and Eastern Europe to deal with the former members of 
the secret police and their collaborators. 
 
Prestige and Bridging Metaphors 
To summarize the argument so far, when states are barred by some norms—in this case, a 
principle imposing legal constraint—from enacting others, such as the emerging global 
norm of accountability for human rights violations, through the usual means (i.e., 
prosecution), an alternative script must be employed. Under such circumstances, an 
alternative script is most likely to be selected when it has frame resonance by virtue of a 
schematic antecedent—an historical precursor that provides a model as to how to 
proceed. I will now argue that a further condition is necessary for implementing 
alternative scripts: prestige. 
 In research that tracks “legal transplant”—that is, diffusion—from Western 
countries to the post-Communist states, Ajani (1995:93) argues that such borrowing 
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occurs both “by chance and prestige.” In Ajani’s usage, prestige refers to the weight 
accorded to Anglo-American (i.e., common law) legal theories by Russian and other 
jurists, particularly with respect to how Western law has been used to forge market 
economies and undergird democratic development in Eastern Europe. In the case of 
lustration, I argue that it is the prestige of Germany—the first to adopt post-Communist 
lustration—that has spurred subsequent lustration diffusion. I offer three kinds of 
evidence for this claim—interview data, NGO documentation, and transcripts of 
parliamentary debate, all from Southeastern Europe. 
 I interviewed Novica Veljanovski40, a member of Macedonia’s Data Verification 
Commission, at the commission’s office on the 17th floor of MRT Center, home to 
Macedonia’s national broadcaster, in Skopje. Dr. Veljanovski41 is a distinguished scholar 
and emeritus professor of history at Saints Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje. At 
one point in our conversation, I asked him if there were any country whose lustration 
system he would like Macedonia to emulate as an exemplar of best practices. In response, 
Dr. Veljanovski turned to the bookshelf and produced an English translation of the 1990 
German lustration law in pamphlet form. That this document was kept at the ready for 
easy reference is, I believe, a sign of the influence it holds over the commission’s work. 
                                                
40 Personal Communication. July 19, 2011. Skopje, Macedonia. 
41 It should be noted that Dr. Veljanovski is an ardent defender of the lustration process in Macedonia, 
having been on the commission since it was formed in 2009. In 2012, when the country’s lustration law 
was being rewritten by parliament after being partially struck down by the Constitutional Court, 
Veljanovski told a local newspaper of his desire for increased transparency with regard to the commission’s 
findings: “I support the proposal to publish names of collaborators to secret services. … I believe that 
documents should be published also for those who oppose or deny collaboration and accuse the 
Commission of incompetence, amateurism, selectiveness and arbitrariness” (Danilovska-Bajdevska and 
Naumovska 2012:140-141). Although I reached out to every member of the Commission individually, I 
was not able to obtain an interview with any member who is more critical of the lustration process. 
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Another key informant I interviewed was Dr. Ivan Jankovic,42 a human rights and 
intellectual property lawyer in Belgrade who also holds a PhD in sociology from the 
University of California at Santa Barbara. I contacted Dr. Jankovic because at one time 
he was a member of the executive committee of the Center for Antiwar Action (CAA),43 
a Serbian NGO that advocated for lustration in that country. When I asked Dr. Jankovic 
whether in 2011 it were too late for Serbia to begin its lustration process, he replied that 
he did not think so and discoursed at length about Germany and how it compared to 
Serbia. His comments on the matter are worth setting out in extenso: 
I always think of a comparative example of Germany. In my understanding of 
history, generally, of how things developed generally and in particular in 
Germany, it takes one generation—it’s a minimum—for a society which had 
undergone such strain as Serbian society did under Milosevic for those 10 years, 
15 years. Or as German society did for 10 or 15 years from 1933 to the end of the 
war. And it was shown beautifully by a colleague of ours… whose name is 
Helmut Dubiel, a German sociologist. He wrote a little book called Niemand ist 
frei von der Geschichte (No One Is Free from History). Methodologically it was 
very beautifully simple. What he did was to search the … records of the German 
parliament, when it was first introduced … until in 1980s. And what he looked at 
is how members of the German parliament in this period for 30 years spoke of the 
victims, who in their eyes were the victims. And he found out that until 1968, no 
one talked, for example, about victimization of the Jews. Not a word! No one ever 
said, “Among the victims of the Second World War, as a separate group, there 
were Jews.” Until that time, 1968, the only victims of the war were perceived to 
be the Germans themselves. In two ways: on the one hand, they were perceived as 
victims of Nazism, of Hitler’s regime, which they no doubt were. On the other, 
they were perceived as victims of excessive military destruction after 1942 or 
1943. That’s reference to Dresden. The Allied bombings of destruction of German 
cities—huge number of civilian victims. And even—that’s probably a third 
category—they were victims of the Allied occupation authorities. So in 1968, for 
the first time, there is a mention of the Jews. And then I don’t remember exactly 
when, successively, Roma—the gypsies—homosexuals, etc., etc. Everything 
that’s today [a] staple. If you go to Germany, the first thing that will happen to 
                                                
42 Personal communication. June 14, 2011. Belgrade, Serbia. 
43 CAA was founded as a peace organization in 1991, and is now known as the Center for Peace and 
Democracy Development. 
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you … you’ll be taken to the synagogue and shown-- which is all fine. I’m not 
objecting to it, but it’s a comparatively recent development. 
 
And I think the same applies to any society. I don’t think that globalization, 
communications, etc. change anything, or at least they don’t change much in this 
respect. It is not the availability of the information about what has happened that 
stops people from acknowledging their own responsibility. Not at all. It is deep 
existential interest which prevents most people— … There are exceptions. There 
were exceptions in Germany. There were exceptions in Serbia…. There will 
always be exceptions. So some people did help Jews in Germany under Hitler. 
Some people did help Croats in Serbia, or Muslims or whatever. But for the bulk 
of the population it takes generational change. That’s what happened in Germany 
in 1968. That was when young people started asking their parents about what 
really happened. And that’s when it started to unravel. You had Nuremberg trials, 
you had everything that you had in the [19]40’s. It was not a question of learning 
something new. 
 
These interview examples show that other countries consider Germany, generally, and 
Germany’s pursuit of lustration, in particular, as a model that ought to be emulated for at 
least two primary reasons: 1) Germany’s prior experience of dealing with the Nazi 
regime, and 2) other countries’ ability to see their experience with Communism as 
analogous to Germany’s, making them likely to follow a similar path.44 
In 2002, CAA conducted a study45 of secret police file declassification and 
lustration in other post-Communist states with the aim of recommending policies and best 
practices that could be implemented in Serbia. In particular, the CAA report draws a 
contrast between the experiences with lustration in Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic, 
which is cited as an example of “legal incompetence,” and the former German 
Democratic Republic, which is described as “successful” (p. 111). Among other problems 
                                                
44 This is an example of what Savelsberg, King, and Minyard (2011:63) have termed “prognostic bridging,” 
which is the use of metaphors to predict “likely future consequences of events that are considered similar” 
(cf. Alexander 2004). 
45 Milosavljevic and Pavicevic 2002, Secret Files: Opening the Files of State Security Services. I am 
grateful to Marina Jelic for providing me with a copy of this document. 
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with lustration in Czechoslovakia, a list of dubious veracity containing more than 
140,000 names of alleged StB associates was leaked to the press. The list even included 
Czech president Vaclav Havel, the playwright and dissident widely credited with helping 
to bring about the end of Communist party rule in Czechoslovakia. There was much 
reputational damage done to the persons included in the leak, and they lacked any means 
of recourse against the unknown person(s) who released the list. By contrast, the 
lustration process in the former East Germany was accompanied by a simultaneous 
release of the Stasi’s files. CAA credits this fact with ensuring a more “just process” in 
Germany than in Czechoslovakia, but notes that “more trust [was placed] on what was 
written in the files than on the circumstances under which an individual had begun 
collaborating with the Stasi” (pp. 111-112). 
As a final bit of evidence of Germany’s influence, I offer that the parliamentary 
opponents of lustration in Serbia used as a line of argument that the situation in their 
country was not similar to Germany. To use the terminology of Savelsberg et al (2011), 
they proposed “bridging challenges.” Member of Parliament Dragan Pavlovic, for 
example, argued that the Serbian lustration law was unconstitutional and not appropriate 
for his country:  
 
The second objective sought to be achieved by this process is the destruction and 
suppression of the authentic expression of the will of the Serbian people. … 
The promoters of lustration … found denazification, a concept associated with 
something applied in fascist Germany, and for something like this, not only do the 
conditions not exist in Serbia, but just thinking about it insults the dignity of 
and the pride of the Serbian people.46 
 
                                                
46 Transcript. National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. Eighth Session. First Regular Session. 30 May 
2003. p. 120 
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Similarly, Dragan Colic of the Serbian Radical Party argued, “Comparison with fascist 
Germany, the idea of denazification, offends the pride, honor and name of Serbs.”47 That 
lustration opponents felt it necessary to denounce the German model indicates the 
influence that it had over the debate in Serbia. 
In line with WPN, Germany’s prestige no doubt derives in part from its powerful 
position in the international community. It is the most economically powerful country in 
the European Union and an exemplar of democracy. It is, therefore, the prestige of the 
German model—a model built on Germany’s past experience of dealing with both the 
Nazi and Communist regimes—that offers other countries permission to pursue a strategy 
that would otherwise be eschewed, according to WPN, due to negative pressure from the 
international community. 
 
Conclusion 
 In one respect, this chapter is a story of regional isomorphism. The model 
presented here is not meant to explain whether or when a particular country adopts 
lustration. Instead, it has been concerned with showing why this particular form of 
transitional justice predominates in the post-Communist states. On the other hand, the 
chapter is meant to have general applicability beyond the specific case of lustration by 
taking advantage of the possibilities that come from analyzing negative cases. Lustration 
presents a theoretical challenge to world polity neoinstitutionalism. The theory predicts 
that policies should not diffuse when they are assailed by powerful international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations. Despite the fact that lustration is not 
                                                
47 ibid. p. 134 
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supported by many such actors, lustration laws have diffused throughout the post-
Communist region. This chapter has attempted to resolve this paradox by developing new 
concepts, repurposing other concepts, and proposing relationships among them: In the 
presence of a legal constraint structure, an alternative script must be developed to enact 
global norms. Such a script is likely to be one that has frame resonance and is predicated 
on a schematic antecedent. Further, the case of lustration suggests that schematic 
antecedents achieve legitimacy not through global consensus, as is suggested by WPN, 
but through the prestige of a specific actor or actors whose experience can be 
satisfactorily compared to other actors’ experience with bridging metaphors. I have 
attempted to formulate this model in an abstract way so as to suggest its applicability to 
other potential cases that present as paradoxes vis-à-vis world polity theory. In particular, 
the case of lustration indicates to scholars working in the tradition of WPN the need to 
consider how regional factors, such as a similar or shared history, can play a role in 
mediating between the global and the national.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  66 
Appendix 3.1 
 
Council of Europe, Document 7668, 1996 
 
“Guidelines to ensure that lustration laws and similar administrative measures comply 
with the requirements of a state based on the rule of law” 
 
To be compatible with a state based on the rule of law, lustration laws must fulfill certain 
requirements. Above all, the focus of lustration should be on threats to fundamental 
human rights and the democratisation process; revenge may never be a goal of such laws, 
nor should political or social misuse of the resulting lustration process be allowed. The 
aim of lustration is not to punish people presumed guilty — this is the task of prosecutors 
using criminal law — but to protect the newly-emerged democracy. 
 
a. Lustration should be administered by a specifically created independent commission of 
distinguished citizens nominated by the head of state and approved by parliament; 
 
b. Lustration may only be used to eliminate or significantly reduce the threat posed by the 
lustration subject to the creation of a viable free democracy by the subject's use of a 
particular position to engage in human rights violations or to block the democratisation 
process; 
 
c. Lustration may not be used for punishment, retribution or revenge; punishment may be 
imposed only for past criminal activity on the basis of the regular Criminal Code and in 
accordance with all the procedures and safeguards of a criminal prosecution; 
 
d. Lustration should be limited to positions in which there is good reason to believe that 
the subject would pose a significant danger to human rights or democracy, that is to say 
appointed state offices involving significant responsibility for making or executing 
governmental policies and practices relating to internal security, or appointed state offices 
where human rights abuses may be ordered and/or perpetrated, such as law enforcement, 
security and intelligence services, the judiciary and the prosecutor's office; 
 
e. Lustration shall not apply to elective offices, unless the candidate for election so 
requests — voters are entitled to elect whomever they wish (the right to vote may only be 
withdrawn from a sentenced criminal upon the decision of a court of law — this is not an 
administrative lustration, but a criminal law measure); 
 
f. Lustration shall not apply to positions in private or semi-private organisations, since 
there are few, if any, positions in such organisations with the capacity to undermine or 
threaten fundamental human rights and the democratic process; 
 
g. Disqualification for office based on lustration should not be longer than five years, 
since the capacity for positive change in an individual's attitude and habits should not be 
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underestimated; lustration measures should preferably end no later than 31 December 
1999, because the new democratic system should be consolidated by that time in all 
former communist totalitarian countries; 
 
h. Persons who ordered, perpetrated, or significantly aided in perpetrating serious human 
rights violations may be barred from office; where an organisation has perpetrated serious 
human rights violations, a member, employee or agent shall be considered to have taken 
part in these violations if he was a senior official of the organisation, unless he can show 
that he did not participate in planning, directing or executing such policies, practices, or 
acts; 
 
i. No person shall be subject to lustration solely for association with, or activities for, any 
organisation that was legal at the time of such association or activities (except as set out 
above in sub-paragraph h), or for personal opinions or beliefs; 
 
j. Lustration shall be imposed only with respect to acts, employment or membership 
occurring from 1 January 1980 until the fall of the communist dictatorship, because it is 
unlikely that anyone who has not committed a human rights violation in the last ten years 
will now do so (this time-limit does not, of course, apply to human rights violations 
prosecuted on the basis of criminal laws);  
 
k. Lustration of "conscious collaborators" is permissible only with respect to individuals 
who actually participated with governmental offices (such as the intelligence services) in 
serious human rights violations that actually harmed others and who knew or should have 
known that their behaviour would cause harm; 
 
l. Lustration shall not be imposed on a person who was under the age of 18 when engaged 
in the relevant acts, in good faith voluntarily repudiated and/or abandoned membership, 
employment or agency with the relevant organisation before the transition to a 
democratic regime, or who acted under compulsion; 
 
m. In no case may a person be lustrated without his being furnished with full due process 
protection, including but not limited to the right to counsel (assigned if the subject cannot 
afford to pay), to confront and challenge the evidence used against him, to have access to 
all available inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, to present his own evidence, to have 
an open hearing if he requests it, and the right to appeal to an independent judicial 
tribunal. 
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Chapter 4. 
Lustration in the Former Yugoslavia: A Strategic Narrative Approach 
 
 
“I am in blood 
Stepp'd in so far, that, should I wade no more, 
Returning were as tedious as go o'er.” 
William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act III, scene iv 
 
The independent states formed by the breakup of Yugoslavia have traveled 
different paths with respect to considering, adopting, and implementing lustration 
policies. This chapter compares the lustration experiences of three of those former 
Yugoslav republics: Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. In Croatia, a marginal, far-right 
political party introduced a lustration bill in the parliament in both 199848 and 199949, but 
the bill was not given a vote or even put on the legislative agenda either time50. By 
contrast, the Serbian parliament did adopt a lustration law in 200351, but that law was 
never implemented and, ultimately, expired quietly in 2013 (Ristić 2013). The 
Macedonian parliament adopted a lustration law in 200852, and, going one step further 
than Serbia, the lustration commission began enforcing it in 2009. Following anti-
lustration rulings from domestic administrative and constitutional courts in Macedonia 
(Brunwasser 2012), further iterations of the law53 have been adopted and implemented 
                                                
48 Bill No. 396, "Bill on the elimination of the consequences of the totalitarian communist regime," 
submitted February 11, 1998. 
49 Bill No. 657, "Bill on the elimination of the consequences of the totalitarian communist regime," 
submitted September 30, 1999. 
50 Sraga, Daniela, email correspondence, June 8, 2012. (Head of Information and Documentation 
Department, Croatian Parliament) 
51 No. 58/2003, "Accountability for Human Rights Violations Act," adopted May 30, 2003 
52 "Law on Additional Requirements for Public Office," Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No. 
14, January 29, 2008 
53 "Law Amending the Law on Additional Requirements for Public Office," Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Macedonia, No. 24, February 25, 2011 
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with persistence in that country. These divergent outcomes—no law in Croatia, a law 
without enforcement in Serbia, and a law with enforcement in Macedonia54—merit 
sociological analysis. 
In this chapter, I employ the “strategic narrative” analytic method developed by 
Stryker (1989, 1990, 1996) to answer the question, “Why are there divergent outcomes 
with lustration in countries responding to a common Communist past?” Useful in 
qualitative historical sociological research, strategic narratives proceed by first 
constructing an analytic case as both theoretically and empirically anomalous. Such 
anomalies require researchers to bring all available theoretical knowledge to bear in order 
to reframe the theoretical lens for viewing a given case. This reframing forms the basis 
for a cumulative, phased-in comparative research design. Each phase builds new 
narratives and results in the mutual construction of history and theory. Along the way, the 
method generates new hypotheses, concepts, and findings, and each research phase 
prefigures the next. The approach is "narrative" in that it emphasizes stories based on 
eventful time--that is, key turning points in the process under consideration. And the 
approach is "strategic" in that it posits that some narratives are better than others for the 
purposes of theory building (Stryker 1996). Thus, this chapter develops an analytic 
narrative, a "theoretically structured [story] about coherent sequences of motivated 
                                                                                                                                            
"Law to Determine the Condition of Limitation for Public Office, Access to Documents and Publication of 
Cooperation with the Organs of State Security," Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, No.86, July 
9, 2012.	  
54 I do not actually analyze the case of Macedonia on its own in this chapter, as it conforms neatly to 
established explanations of lustration. Specifically, the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE party, which has ruled 
Macedonia for several years, has implemented lustration and uses it, many say, as a tool for smearing 
political opponents. I am more interested in exploring anomalous cases rather than confirmatory ones. 
Macedonia should be thought of as a referent case, one against which to contrast the experiences of Croatia 
and Serbia. 
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actions" that "can contribute to the construction of explanations of why things happened 
the way they did" (Aminzade 1992:458) and, implicitly, why they did not happen some 
other way. 
The current “politics of the past” and “politics of the present” (Stan 2008) 
explanations of lustration both foreground a country’s experience with democratization as 
a central mechanism in the deployment of transitional justice. As such, these approaches 
obscure the Communist-era institutional histories that I argue are determinative, in the 
path-dependent sense (Aminzade 1992; Pierson 2004), of outcomes with lustration. My 
approach links the past to the present by showing how the weight of history constrains or 
enables current decision making in the former Yugoslavia. 
In section one of this chapter, I begin my strategic narrative by constructing the 
case of Croatia as both an empirical and a theoretical anomaly in light of existing 
research. That is, although there has been no lustration in Croatia, current theory suggests 
that the policy should have been adopted there, more so than anywhere else in the former 
Yugoslavia. I then reframe the theoretical backdrop by developing a chronological 
historical narrative of the Croatian secret police from its founding as an autonomous unit 
within the larger Yugoslav state security apparatus in 1966. Such a narrative is not only 
an historical account; the strategic narrative method requires that I conceptualize in 
abstract and general terms the issue of whether and how the state makes use of and 
regulates the security sector. My reframing focuses on political sociology's concept of 
policy feedback (Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Pierson 1993; Thelen 1999; Campbell 
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2012). The second section of the chapter focuses in turn on Serbia and operates as a 
cumulative, phased-in analysis that builds on the findings of the preceding case. 
 
I. Croatia 
 
Croatia: A Theoretical and Empirical Anomaly 
Lavinia Stan (2008) divides explanations of lustration into those that emphasize 
“the politics of the past” and those that emphasize “the politics of the present.” I argue 
that the failure of lustration in Croatia is anomalous with respect to both kinds of 
explanations. Specifically, I will show that theories developed by Huntington (1991), 
Stan (2008, 2009), and Welsh (1994) do not apply to Croatia. The failure of these 
explanations reflects the tendency in the literature on lustration, previously mentioned in 
chapter 2, of focusing on only a handful of positive cases of lustration (e.g., Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Hungary) and ignoring both other positive cases (e.g., Serbia) and 
negative cases of lustration (e.g., Croatia). Further, Croatia is the only country that fails 
all three theories, making it an empirical anomaly as well as a theoretical one. 
 
Croatia’s Replacement Transition 
Recall from chapter 2 that Huntington (1991) developed a typology of transitions 
to democracy. The three kinds of transitions he identifies are replacement, 
transformation, and transplacement. According to Huntington, transitional justice is most 
likely to occur in states that undergo a replacement transition--that is, a transition in 
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which the undemocratic regime is severely weakened and overthrown by the opposition. 
In this section, I argue that Croatia underwent a replacement transition in 1990-95 and, 
according to Huntington, should have been likely to adopt lustration. Croatia is, therefore, 
a theoretical anomaly with respect to Huntington's argument about the mode of exit from 
anti-democratic regimes. 
The wave of democratizing reforms that hit Eastern Europe in 1989 resonated in 
Croatia, then still one of the six constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY).55 Initially, it seemed that Croatia could undergo a transformation 
transition, wherein the regime itself introduces liberalizing reforms. In December of that 
year, Croatia’s League of Communists voted to allow additional political parties to exist 
and to contest forthcoming elections. Franjo Tudjman, a JNA56 general turned historian 
turned political prisoner, had already established a right-wing nationalist party known as 
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in February 1989. Tudjman, who was allowed to 
travel despite his dissident status, was particularly successful at garnering the support of 
Croats living abroad, especially in Canada. When the first multi-party elections in almost 
50 years were held in Croatia in April and May 1990, HDZ won a majority of seats in the 
Sabor (parliament). Their 42% share of the vote was a plurality, but enough for a 
majority in an electoral system that lacked proportional representation (Lampe 2000).  
Almost two weeks after the 1990 election, a riot erupted between rival fans of the 
(Croatian) Dinamo Zagreb and (Serbian) Red Star Belgrade professional soccer teams at 
a match in Zagreb, the Croatian capital. The setting was predisposed to allow easy 
                                                
55 The other five are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. 
56 Yugoslav People’s Army, the military of the SFRY and its successor state the FRY (essentially Serbia). 
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demarcation between Croats, who had just elected Tudjman's secessionist political party, 
and Serbs, who wanted to preserve a united Yugoslavia. The incident, which lasted for 
over an hour, was more than just another instance in a long line of European soccer 
hooliganism. The Serb criminal and eventual warlord Željko Ražnatović, better known by 
the alias Arkan, was among the Red Star fans in the audience. He later went on to recruit 
members of his paramilitary group—the Tigers, who were responsible for war crimes in 
Bosnia—from the Red Star fans in attendance that day. In Croatia, the riot was seen as a 
turning point in relations with Serbia and is now remembered with nationalist pride. 
Outside Maksimir Stadium, where the match was held, there is a statue of a group of 
soldiers. Its inscription reads, “To the fans of the club, who started the war with Serbia at 
this ground on May 13, 1990” (Montague 2011, np). 
Officially, though, the war did not begin for another year. But the combination of 
Tudjman’s rise to power, strained relations between Croats and Serbs, and Croatia’s 
declaration of independence from Yugoslavia on June 26, 1991, did begin a brutal four-
year war that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands and many more displaced 
refugees (Goldstein 1999; Lampe 2000). It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to give 
a full account of the Croatian War of Independence; it will suffice for the moment to say 
that Croatia’s decisive military victory in 1995 provided a hard break from 
Yugoslavia/Serbia. In my view, this constitutes a replacement transition. By 
Huntington’s formulation, there was ample opportunity under these conditions to punish 
the vanquished socialist regime, particularly those loyal to Belgrade. Because that did not 
happen, the Croatian case is anomalous with respect to Huntington’s theory. 
  74 
Communist Opposition and Elite Repression 
Comparative research by Stan (2008, 2009) argues that the pursuit of lustration is 
determined by a combination of three factors: the strength of the anti-Communist 
opposition both pre- and post-1989, the Communist regime’s strategy for dealing with 
elites (either repression or co-optation), and the extent of a country’s pre-Communist 
experience with political pluralism. While it is true that historians give conflicting 
accounts as to the last of Stan’s three criteria (see chapter 2), Croatia did have a strong 
opposition (nationalist) movement and elites who resisted co-optation, particularly in the 
period after 1966, when Croats were emboldened by Tito’s firing of Aleksandar 
Rankovic (Tanner 2010) (see below).  The Croatian nationalist movement emerged as a 
mass force in the spring of 1971. The student newspaper at the University of Zagreb 
became a forum for nationalist discourse. Other institutions, including Radio-Television 
Zagreb and the cultural society Matica Hrvatska, stepped up their nationalist rhetoric 
(Burg 1983). The “Croatian Spring,” as it came to be known, culminated in November 
1971 with a strike by Zagreb students. They had several demands, including recognition 
of the Croatian language as separate from Serbian and a sovereign Croatian state. Tito 
responded with police repression throughout the country: thousands were detained and 
many students and members of Matica Hrvatska were put on trial and given prison 
sentences (Goldstein 1999). The goals of the Croatian Spring were not realized at the 
time. However, the movement indicated that mass mobilization against the regime was 
possible. Further, among those detained was Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman, as we have seen, 
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went on to become the first President of Croatia, providing yet another reason as to why 
we would expect Croatia to engage in lustration.  
 
Right-Wing Party in Power 
 Welsh's (1994) research suggests that lustration is most likely to be implemented 
by Right parties. The case of Croatia is anomalous with respect to this argument. The 
country's first post-war parliamentary elections were held on October 29, 1995. Franjo 
Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) emerged victorious, winning 45.23% of 
the vote and securing 75 of the 127 seats in the Sabor. The Manifesto Project Database 
(Volkens et al 2013) codes political party manifestos and rates parties' policy positions on 
a range of topics. Each party is given a score ranging from -100 (left) to +100 (right) 
based on those party positions. The table below shows the five political parties that 
garnered the most votes in the 1995 Croatian parliamentary elections, along with their 
vote share, seats won, and right-left score. Of the parties that gained a significant share of 
the vote, HDZ is rated as being the furthest to the right. 
 
 
Party	   Vote	  Share	   Seats	   Right-­‐Left	  Score	  
Croatian	  Democratic	  Union	  (HDZ)	   45.23	   75	   +47.4	  
Coalition:	  HSS-­‐IDS-­‐HNS-­‐HKDU-­‐SBHS	   18.26	   20	   +3.6	  
Croatian	  Social	  Liberal	  Party	  (HSLS)	   11.55	   11	   +13.9	  
Social	  Democratic	  Party	  (SDP)	   8.93	   9	   +3.0	  
Croatian	  Party	  of	  Rights	  (HSP)	   5.01	   4	   +14.0	  
Table 4.1: Top 5 Political Parties, 1995 Croatian Parliamentary Elections 
Source: Manifesto Project Database (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/) 
 
According to Welsh, when lustration was introduced in this parliament by the 
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) in 1998 and 1999, one would expect a Right party like 
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HDZ--particularly one headed by a president who himself was a dissident and political 
prisoner of the Communist regime--to be supportive of such a measure. Moreover, the 
1995 elections represented HDZ at its furthest right moment. The table below shows the 
right-left movement of HDZ for the first decade of its existence. With each successive 
election, the party moved increasingly rightward through the 1990's. Following 
Tudjman's death in late 1999, the party tacked significantly to the left for the 2000 
elections, which it lost. Despite the rightward leanings of HDZ at the time, the party did 
not support lustration. HDZ did not allow HSP's bill to be placed on the agenda in either 
1998 or 1999, and it was never voted on (Lalić 2005). 
 
Year	  
Right-­‐Left	  
Score	  
1990	   +3.4	  
1992	   +25.8	  
1995	   +47.4	  
2000	   -­‐13.4	  
Table 4.2: Right-Left Scores of HDZ, 1990-2000 
Source: Manifesto Project Database (https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/) 
 
The Croatian Party of Rights--the political party that introduced the lustration bill 
in the Croatian Sabor on two occasions--describes itself as a "right-wing party" that 
"advocates conservative and Christian democratic philosophies" (HSP website 2013). 
The party traces its origins to 1861. Founders Ante Starcević and Eugen Kvaternik 
wanted an independent Croatia that was not part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. When 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was formed in 1918, the party was opposed to what it now 
describes as the "tragic unification of Croatia with Serbia" (ibid.). HSP, therefore, has a 
long history of promoting nationalism. 
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 At HSP's Fourth Convention on September 18, 1999, the party adopted a 
resolution detailing an eight-part program. Two of the eight points deal with lustration. 
The resolution argues that Croatia is not ready for European integration but that "the 
difficult current situation of the Croatian people and the Croatian state and its economic 
system can be quickly overcome by implementing lustration and awakening the moral 
values of the Croatian people." HSP also asserts that to bring order to the state and 
society requires, inter alia, "lustration from public life all advocates of the defeated 
Communist ideology and the failed Communist government" (HSP 2013). 
The bills introduced by HSP were identical and were clearly based on the Council 
of Europe’s Resolution 1096 (see chapter 3). Echoing the title of Resolution 1096, HSP’s 
bill is known as the “Draft Law on the elimination of the consequences of the totalitarian 
communist regime” (pg. 2). The bill contains disingenuous language about how the 
adoption of lustration would aid in the accession of Croatia to the European Union and 
NATO, something that HSP actually opposed.  
Passing this law would contribute to the international reputation of Croatia and 
allow faster and easier admission to the European Union and NATO. For 
example, in an alliance of democratic states to defend freedom NATO received 
only those states that have adopted lustration law in the period 1995-1997. 
 
Reframing the Case: Uses of the Secret Police Since 1966 
Having established Croatia as an anomalous case with respect to existing theory, the 
strategic narrative method requires a reframing of the case along new theoretical lines. In 
this section of the chapter, I will offer path-dependency arguments about the lack of 
lustration in Croatia. I show that after a political crisis in 1966, the autonomous Croatian 
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secret police began a campaign of assassinations that were viewed as being pro-
nationalist. As an example, I will discuss the elimination of a Croatian émigré in West 
Germany and the absence of any desire in Croatia to punish the secret police agent that 
allegedly carried out the killings. I will also discuss the role of institutional inertia owing 
to the 1991-95 war that kept many of the UDBa in place. 
 
The Ouster of Aleksandar Ranković57 
Before 1966, Aleksandar Rankovic was widely believed to be the person who 
would succeed Josip Broz Tito as president of Yugoslavia. As Minister of Internal 
Affairs, Rankovic oversaw the Yugoslav secret police. It came as a surprise when it was 
announced at a session of the Communist party’s Central Committee on July 1, 1966, that 
Tito had fired Rankovic, creating what the CIA described as the “greatest crisis [for 
Tito’s regime] since Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform in 1948” (p. 1). The 
official reason given for the firing was that Rankovic and his ally Svetislav Stefanovic 
were consolidating power by placing secret police officers in various government and 
party positions. Rankovic was getting too eager about the possibility of taking over from 
Tito, and there were multiple offenses that led to the ouster. Rankovic ordered wiretaps of 
high-ranking government officials’ homes and offices. Through the UDBa, he had 
amassed files on a million people in Croatia—nearly one-fourth of the population, a clear 
abuse of power that shocked Tito. It should be noted that Rankovic, who was a Serb, had 
an uneasy time with interethnic relations in the government. In addition to applying a too-
                                                
57 This section relies on a declassified CIA document, “Yugoslavia—The Fall of Rankovic,” from August 
5, 1966. 
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heavy hand to spying on Croats, Rankovic had clashed with them over tourism. In the 
early 1960’s, some Croats in the government wanted to establish visa-free entry for 
foreign tourists who wanted to visit Croatia’s famously beautiful coastline. Rankovic 
maintained that such tourists posed a security threat and deployed the UDBa to harass 
them (Tanner 2010). The firing was accompanied by a purge of Rankovic supporters 
from the government and a reorganization of the secret police into six separate, 
autonomous units for each of the republics. 
 
Path Dependency: Policy Feedback and Critical Junctures  
 The concept of policy feedback58 is used by political sociologists to indicate how 
“policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes … making some future 
developments more likely, and hindering the possibilities for others” (Skocpol 1992:58, 
232). Much of the literature that has been produced by scholars working in this tradition 
has dealt with the establishment of social policy (e.g., Skocpol and Amenta 1986; 
Pedriana and Stryker 1997; Steensland 2006). Some research emphasizes functional 
mechanisms that lead to such feedback. According to Thelen (1999:392), functionalist 
accounts propose that “once a set of institutions is in place, actors adapt their strategies in 
ways that reflect but also reinforce the logic of the system” (cf. Ikenberry 1994; North 
1990). Other research focuses on the distributional effects of institutions that empower 
some groups while disenfranchising others (Thelen 1999). A related concept important 
for path-dependency research is critical junctures or turning points, which often result in 
                                                
58 This concept is sometimes called policy legacy. Pedriana and Stryker (1997:638) prefer the term feeding 
forward, since “past policies structure current policies and current policies structure future policies.” 
  80 
“intertia” that reproduces institutional patterns. “Once processes are set into motion and 
begin tracking a particular outcome,” says (Mahoney 2000:511), “these processes these 
processes tend to stay in motion and continue to track this outcome.” Both policy 
feedback and critical junctures are useful for explaining the case of Croatian lustration. 
 
The War: A Critical Juncture in 1991 
 
The 1991-95 Croatian War of Independence created a need to maintain the status quo 
ante with respect to the intelligence services. University of Zagreb professor and former 
president of Croatian Helsinki Committee (HHO)59 Žarko Puhovski spoke to that issue in 
a 2003 interview with the BBC: 
  
 In Croatia [in 1991], the government radically changed in terms of ideology--a 
 nationalist party came to power, by the name of HDZ …. Regardless of the fact 
 that it was headed by a former general of the Yugoslav army, it had a new 
 ideology. But it rather quickly came under attack of the forces in the Yugoslav 
 Army, and in that situation it seemed logical, when you are at war, when you are 
 under attack, that intelligence structures cannot be changed, but must be left as 
 they are and must be placed under control, that some people obviously working 
 for the other side must be fired, and all those who more or less coherently showed 
 that they want to work for the Croatian side should be retained, and that one 
 should be happy they exist (BBC 2003). [emphasis added]60 
 
This is a path-dependency argument that differs markedly from an alternative argument, 
offered by some interlocutors of the author61: the need for transitional justice to deal with 
the Communist period in Croatia was obviated by the need, and even the requirement, to 
seek justice for atrocities committed during the war. In the latter view, all political will to 
                                                
59 HHO is a prominent human rights organization founded in 1993. Prof. Puhovski led the organization 
from 2000-2007. 
60 Prof. Puhovski was interviewed for this research. This particular quotation, however, was occasioned by 
a 2003 conference on lustration in the Western Balkans, held in Belgrade and organized by the 
Thessaloniki-based Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe. 
61 I refer here to the thought-provoking comments made by colleagues at the Woodrow Wilson Center's 
Junior Scholars Training Seminar and the annual conference of the Centers for Austrian Studies.	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deal with the past is expended on the more proximate period of injustice (i.e., the 1990's). 
In other words, the war serves as a mechanism for collective amnesia vis-à-vis the SFRY. 
I do not accept this argument because it cannot explain the legislative success of 
lustration in Serbia, which also experienced the war. In the alternative view, however, the 
war is a mechanism that created institutional inertia with respect to the intelligence 
agencies in the face of an outside threat. This view is echoed by the Croatian intelligence 
service itself. A section on its website about the history of the agency, now known as the 
Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA), argues,  
 
 The so-called JNA stood on the side of the Serbs directly, thus openly involving 
 itself in the aggression against the Republic of Croatia, the Agency, like other 
 state administrative bodies, went through a difficult period at that time and a 
 certain number of its employees did not accept social-political changes and left 
 the Agency. Aware that aggression was being prepared against the Republic of 
 Croatia, an attempt was made to maintain and prepare a healthy core of the 
 Agency for the period which was to follow.62 
 
This statement suggests that any purging of the intelligence services was done due to 
loyalty concerns rather than concerns about abuses of power in the SFRY. Some 
members were thrown out because they were found to have been Serbs who infiltrated 
the agency: 
Through the operative work of the Agency, Agency employees were detected who 
were ''snuck in'' by SDS and KOS in Belgrade and who worked in their interests 
(operation ''Labrador'') (ibid.) 
 
                                                
62 "Intelligence Service's Role in the Creation of the Republic of Croatia" 
https://www.soa.hr/en/history/services_role/ 
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In my own interview with Dr. Puhovski,63 he noted an additional reason as to why 
lustration failed in Croatia: there was no way to construct a lustration policy that would 
not result in the state’s leaders being subject to the policy themselves. 
The reason why it failed in [the 19]90s was basically a very simple one: there was 
no construct of lustration that would avoid the basic characteristic of the 
biography of President Tudjman. And some other officials like Mr. [Josip] 
Manolic64 and so on. Tudjman was a colonel and general in the Yugoslav Army. 
He was a member of the Partisan65 unit in the period of ’45, ’46 when a gross 
massacre of civilians happened after [World War II]. … But after the war, there 
were dozens of thousands of civilians killed in the period when Tudjman was a 
young lieutenant or captain of the Yugoslav Army. And he was part of the 
military intelligence service in a period of his career. The same goes to Mr. 
Manolic and some other members of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], 
which is the official name of the ruling party in the ‘90s and now again. So they 
could not avoid [lustrating themselves].  
 
Even though Tudjman was not a member of the UDBa—or even a member of the 
Communist party—his background in JNA intelligence would have disqualified him from 
office under HSP’s lustration bill. 
Josip Manolic, however, was a high-ranking official in the UDBa. After leaving 
office as Prime Minister in July 1991, he became head of the Bureau of the Protection of 
the Constitutional Order (UZUP). He was, therefore, put in charge of the entirety of the 
Croatian intelligence system at a time when the Croatian War was just beginning. The 
Croatian security services (police, military, intelligence) had to be built up rapidly, and 
the UDBa served as an available pool from which Manolic could draw as he was staffing 
the new intelligence service.66 There are, therefore, issues of both institutional inertia, 
                                                
63 Personal communication. July 23, 2011. Zagreb, Croatia. 
64 Prime Minister of Croatia, August 1990 – July 1991 
65 Yugsoslav anti-Nazi army.  
66 https://www.soa.hr/en/history/uzup/ 
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fueled by the exigencies of war, and the biographical inertia of Croatia’s first leaders 
after independence that precluded the possibility of lustration. 
 
Assassination of Stjepan Djurekovic67  
Following the firing of Aleksandar Rankovic, the UDBa began to lean heavily on 
a policy of assassinations, or “black actions,” against émigrés living abroad. Over a 
twenty-year period, they killed more than 100 people, mostly Croats. The plurality of 
these killings took place in West Germany, which was home to a large population of 
Yugoslav guest workers. The UDBa operated as a very smooth killing machine and were, 
in the assessment of Professor John R. Schindler of the U.S. Naval War College, 
“brilliant” at it and “every bit as nasty as the KGB, and in some ways even worse.” One 
of the highest-profile killings was that of Stjepan Djurekovic, a Croat chief executive of a 
state-owned oil company. Djurekovic, seeing the corruption of the Yugoslav state first 
hand, became “disgusted” and moved to West Germany in 1982. The following year, he 
was killed at his home in the Munich suburb of Wolfratshausen, allegedly by the UDBa 
in a brutal hit. Schindler attributes the killing to the UDBa 2nd Department in Zagreb, the 
branch of the agency that dealt with issues of “enemy emigration.” The head of the 2nd 
Department and Djurekovic’s alleged assassin is a man named Josip Perkovic, who was 
one of the many secret police operatives retained in the post-1991 intelligence apparatus 
by Tudjman, as described above. Perkovic was made an assistant defense minister and 
assistant to Miroslav Tudjman, Franjo Tudjman’s son (Pavelic 2013a). 
                                                
67 This section draws from Schindler, John R. June 29, 2013. “The Legacy of Black Actions” 
http://20committee.com/2013/06/29/the-legacy-of-black-actions/ 
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Perkovic is wanted for questioning about the murder of Djurekovic by Germany, 
who issued an arrest warrant for Perkovic in 2009. The warrant was successfully ignored 
by Croatia for a few years (Pavelic 2013b). However, the situation changed in 2013. 
After years going through the negotiation process, Croatia was admitted to the European 
Union on July 1. One of the many conditions for EU accession is that certain laws must 
be harmonized across member states, including a 2002 EU law on extradition. Initially, 
Croatia refused to change its extradition law to be in line with EU standards, opting 
instead to pass a law that only applies to crimes committed since the EU extradition law 
went into effect in 2002 (Pavelic 2013b). This law was adopted on June 28, parliament’s 
last work day before joining the EU. Many critics thought that Croatia wanted this 
provision specifically to ensure Perkovic’s protection, and the law was dubbed “Lex 
Perkovic” (Perkovic’s law) (Pavelic 2013c). 
In response, German Chancellor Angela Merkel cancelled plans to visit Zagreb 
for the EU accession celebration to be held on June 30, officially saying that she “lacked 
time” to travel to Croatia (Pavelic 2013a, np). Nevertheless, the same day that Merkel 
cancelled her trip, Germany renewed the arrest warrant for Perkovic, cementing the idea 
that the cancellation was tied to Croatia’s adoption of a law that only applied as far back 
as 2002. Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic resisted changing the law because 
other EU member states that acceded before 2002 were not bound to extradite their 
citizens for crimes committed prior to that year. Only states, like Croatia and neighboring 
Slovenia, that had acceded after 2002 were required to extradite citizens for crimes, 
regardless of when they were committed. Milanovic found this double standard to be 
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“twisted” and “discriminatory.”68 Under threat of sanctions from the EU, including 
withholding of $108 million in EU funds meant to prepare Croatia to join the Schengen 
Zone allowing easy border crossings within the EU, Milanovic relented.69 He sent a letter 
to the European Commission President saying, “Croatia will undertake the necessary 
measures to harmonise its law on judicial cooperation with European acquis 
communautaire.”70 The final vote to change the law took place on October 7, 2013.71 
The Djurekovic/Perkovic story highlights a couple of theoretical points. The first 
has to do with path dependency. It is clear that the post-Rankovic killings carried out by 
the Croatian secret police was a policy that escalated over time, continuing after the death 
of Tito in 1980 and only petering out with the fall of Communism. The inclusion of 
Perkovic as a high-ranking officer in the defense ministry, working closely with 
Tudjman’s son, is another indication of how the institutional inertia that maintained the 
power of the secret police after Croatia’s transition. Second, this story provides an 
addendum to the discussion of neoinstitutionalist theory in chapter 3. In it, I argued that 
criminal prosecution was usually not possible for the secret police in the post-Communist 
states, as their actions were often not criminal at the time they were committed. It 
remains to be seen whether Perkovic will be prosecuted, as he is only wanted for 
questioning at this time. But the Djurekovic/Perkovic matter is the exception that proves 
the rule: only when a blatant crime, such as an assassination, is committed, and perhaps 
only when it is committed in the West, is a prosecution of the secret police possible. The 
                                                
68 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatian-pm-eu-rule-discriminatory 
69 http://www.dw.de/croatia-gives-in-to-eu-demands-on-extradition-law/a-17114563 
70 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-to-change-lex-perkovic 
71 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-changes-lex-perkovic 
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case illustrates the power of international governmental organizations to bring about a 
prosecution under those circumstances. This recent event effectively illustrates the 
principle from world polity theory that countries with stronger and denser ties to the 
international community are more susceptible to pressure—in this case, changing an 
extradition law—to conform to international standards.  
 In sum, under several current theories of lustration, Croatia should have been 
among the likeliest countries to implement the policy. It did not. I find that the lack of 
lustration in Croatia is partly due to the occurrence of the war. However, this was not 
because the war distracted from the need to deal with the Communist past, nor because 
the war created a whole new set of human rights violations to address. Instead, the 
sudden outbreak of the war meant that the security sector had to be staffed as quickly as 
possible with persons loyal to Croatia rather than to Serbia. It was therefore out of 
institutional inertia that members of the UDBa came to maintain positions of power in 
post-Yugoslav Croatia. Further, policies enacted to reorganize the secret police after 1966 
meant that many of the Croatian secret police, in particular, had been involved in a brutal 
campaign of assassinations. Their ability to maintain closeness to the Tudjman regime 
shielded them for many years from any kind of accountability, which may now be 
changing.  Thus, the Croatian case suggests the following hypothesis:  
Reforms to the security sector, including lustration, are not likely to occur when 
that sector must be built up rapidly under exigent circumstances, such as war. 
When personnel are retained and form close ties to the new regime, they are likely 
to be shielded from accountability. 
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Consistent with the phased-in nature of the strategic narrative research design 
(Stryker 1996), this hypothesis is subject to revision upon analysis of further cases. In 
fact, the same exigencies that present in the case of Croatia were also present for Serbia. 
Serbia did, however, adopt a lustration law. In the next section of the chapter, I will look 
at how that law came about and why it was never implemented. 
 
 
 
II. Serbia 
If Croatia illustrates the strength of policy feedback for constraining future 
outcomes, the experience with lustration in Serbia illustrates the limits of policy 
feedback. In this section, I will use the case of Serbia to argue about the conditions under 
which policy feedback does not constrain future outcomes. Serbia, as readers will recall, 
adopted a lustration law in 2003. The law expired a decade later having never been 
implemented. Below, I give historical background on the Serbian case, with a focus on 
events leading up to the passage of the lustration law. I will then discuss reasons and 
suggest mechanisms as to why the law was not implemented despite its popularity. 
 
Background 
On March 12, 2003, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was due to meet with 
the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, at the Government Building in Belgrade. 
When Djindjic arrived at 12:25 p.m., he stepped out of his car and was immediately shot 
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and killed by a member of the Red Beret paramilitary—a group responsible for many of 
the atrocities of the Bosnian War of the 1990’s—at the behest of the Serbian Mafia. The 
sniper, Zvezdan Jovanovic, was stationed at the Institute for Photogrammetry, some 600 
feet away. Djindjic’s assassination was the clearest sign of how Serbians’ attitudes 
toward the prime minister had shifted in less than 3 years from admiration to deep 
unpopularity. Following contested elections in September 2000, Djindjic, a former mayor 
of Belgrade, led Serbians in peaceful street protests against the repressive regime of 
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. In what was a forerunner to similar revolutions 
in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Lebanon (Bunce and Wolchik 2011), the Djindjic-
led protests precipitated the ouster of Milosevic and the move to a democratic Serbia on 
October 5, 2000. 
In 2001 Djindjic was elected prime minister on a wave of support. However, 
Djindjic soon fell out of favor as he came under pressure from the West to extradite 
Milosevic to The Hague to stand trial for war crimes at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Although most Serbs were glad that 
Milosevic was out of office, many bristled at the idea that he was a war criminal who 
deserved to be prosecuted by an international court. But Djindjic was swayed by 
promises of financial aid and eventual membership in the European Union and NATO for 
Serbia. He sent Milosevic to The Hague in March 2001, a move that pleased the United 
States and Western Europe and displeased many in Serbia. 
In the immediate post-Milosevic era, Serbia was, at best, reluctant to deal with its 
past. Serbia did decide, similar to many other post-Communist countries, to provide some 
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degree of access to the files of the state security services. On May 22, 2001, the 
government issued a Decree on removing the confidential classification from files held in 
the State Security Service on citizens of the Republic of Serbia. Just a few days later, on 
May 31, 2001, the government changed the name to the Decree on Giving Access to 
Certain Files kept on Citizens of the Republic of Serbia in the State Security Service.  In 
other words, the confidential classification was not lifted.  People were permitted to take 
a glimpse of their file, but were not allowed to inspect it, photocopy it, or discuss it with 
anyone, which would be a violation of state secrets. 
Two years later, the assassin Jovanovic said that he killed Djindjic because he saw 
him as a traitor to Serbia. In the wake of the killing, a state of emergency was declared in 
the country. When the National Assembly resumed its session a week later, new 
legislation was adopted that gave increased powers to law enforcement in combatting 
organized crime. Changes to the criminal code and to the law on public prosecution and a 
new law on weapons and ammunition followed in April. Then, on May 30, 2003, 
realizing that personnel from the Milosevic era still wielded too much power, the 
Assembly adopted the “Law on the Accountability for Human Rights Violations” 
(hereafter, the lustration law). The law established a committee of 8 persons who were to 
investigate the current holders of and future candidates for 21 different offices to decide 
if they had violated human rights as defined by the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which had been ratified by Yugoslavia in 1976. The lustration law was 
enacted by the Assembly using emergency procedures with a vote of 111 in favor, 1 
opposed, 15 abstentions, and 123 members not present for the vote. 
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Despite the apparent political enthusiasm with which the law was adopted, it was 
never enforced. The 8-member commission was never fully constituted; only 7 people 
were named to the body. As such, the commission never took office. Moreover, the law 
expired as scheduled in May 2013, ten years after its passage, with little discussion of its 
renewal. This lack of implementation is surprising given other developments in Serbia 
over the past decade. In the years since Djindjic’s assassination by militant nationalists 
opposed to transitional justice, Serbia’s commitment to transitional justice has only 
grown. In 2003, the same year as the assassination, a special War Crimes Chamber of 
Belgrade District Court was opened to begin domestic prosecutions against suspected 
low-level war criminals that were not sent to The Hague. Serbia’s cooperation with the 
ICTY has also increased. The government extradited the three remaining most-wanted 
war crimes suspects to the court in 2008 and 2011, thereby fulfilling all obligations to the 
court. The National Assembly issued an official apology for Serbia’s role in the 1995 
Srebrenica massacre, the signature atrocity of the Bosnian War, in 2010. And the national 
broadcaster, Radio Television Serbia, issued an apology in 2011 for spreading pro-
Milosevic propaganda during the 1990’s. For these efforts, Serbia was granted Candidate 
Status for the European Union on March 1, 2012. However, lustration has remained an 
unrealized element of Serbia’s embrace of transitional justice. 
 
Popularity of the law 
 Before discussing why lustration has not been implemented in Serbia, it is 
important to note that the reason is not because there is no demand for it. In fact, the idea 
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of lustration in Serbia72 is immensely popular, particularly in contrast to other forms of 
transitional justice. In a survey conducted in March 2009--six years after the lustration 
law was adopted--by Ipsos for the Belgrade Center for Human Rights, 82% of Serbians 
said "Yes" to the question, "Is there a need, at least for a time, to prohibit those who have 
violated human rights from being in public office (i.e., implemented lustration)?" This 
stands in contrast to the 29% who think Serbia should apologize to other countries in the 
region without expecting an apology in return,73 the 37% who have a positive attitude 
toward the ICTY, the 46% who feel there is a need to establish a truth commission, and 
the 50%74 who approve of the handling of war crimes by Serbian domestic courts. Even 
among ethnic Serbs, who are very likely to regard transitional justice measures with 
suspicion or distaste, support for lustration stands at 79% (BCLP 2009). Of course, it is 
probable that lustration is so popular because it has not been implemented. The idea of 
banning human rights violators from office may sound like a good idea and may lend 
itself to social desirability bias--the tendency for persons to respond to surveys with what 
they think is the appropriate response. Seeing lustration in practice, though, would likely 
be controversial as persons would likely differ with respect to who should be lustrated.75 
 
 
 
                                                
72 The survey cited excludes Kosovo but is representative of the rest of the country. (N=1,433) 6% of 
Serbians said "No" to the lustration question, and 12% had no opinion. 
73 Another 52% support an apology by Serbia, but only if it is accompanied by similar apologies from 
Bosnia and Croatia. 
74 This figure represents those who gave a score of 3 or higher on a 5-point scale ranging from Very Bad to 
Very Good. Counting only those who rated domestic courts as a 4 or 5, support drops to 12%. 
75 See the end of this chapter for a discussion of further analysis of this data. 
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When Policy Feedback Fails 
 Patashnik and Zelizer (2009) offer three reasons as to why policies do not feed 
back: weak policy design, inadequate or conflicting institutional supports, and poor 
timing. I argue that all three of those are present in the case of the Serbian lustration law, 
and I will add the additional mechanisms of regulatory capture and stoking conspiracy 
theories. In this section, I draw on transcripts of debate from Serbia’s National Assembly 
on May 29-30, 2003, the text of the law itself, and interviews with key informants. 
 
Weak Policy Design 
The weakness of the lustration law’s design comes from how opponents were able to take 
the framing of providing redress to violations of human rights and turn that against the 
law by pointing out how the law would further violate human rights. They pointed out 
ways the law could be misused and questioned its seemingly arbitrary start date. 
Moreover, a strategy developed to ensure the law's passage may have actually 
undermined it. 
 Article 5 of Serbia's lustration law defines human rights violations as follows: 
 …every action undertaken by a person specified in this Law in discharge of duty 
 and/or task, which: 
 1. represents a criminal offence or other punishable act which is prosecuted ex 
 officio, which has fallen under the statute of limitations for criminal or other penal 
 prosecution, in whose commission the person specified under this Law 
 participated as a perpetrator, instigator, accomplice, abettor, organizer of criminal 
 conspiracy or whose commission such person failed to prevent in accordance with 
 his/her legal powers.  
 2. has as its aim to deprive a person of his/her lawful rights or to hinder exercise 
 of such rights, or to enable a person to acquire a right or benefit to which such 
 person is not entitled under law; or  
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 3. has as its aim to influence a state body, organization, enterprise or other legal 
 entity to take a decision or undertake an act which brings citizen into an unequal 
 position.  
 
During the parliamentary debate over the law, issues regarding this framing were raised 
by several lawmakers. Zarko Obradovic76 argued that the law was not truly designed with 
human rights in mind: 
 This Act introduces a presumption of guilt, not innocence. It is retrospective in 
 character, and selective, because it is not concerned with who violated human 
 rights in Serbia, but applies only to persons who apply for participation in public 
 life. It is essentially a way to dissuade people from participating in elections. (p. 
 7)77 
 
Gordana Pop-Lazic78 brought an historical perspective to the discussion by referencing 
the May 1903 coup against the royal family in Serbia: 
 I remind you that today is May 29. How ironic. 100 years ago today the royal 
 couple were killed, and clearly [now] you want to kill political opponents, to a 
 make a political assassination or cause political suicide…This law, I'm sure, will 
 lead to your [lustration supporters] political suicide. The Serbian Radical Party 
 does not fear that we will be affected by this law. … We are against political 
 retaliation against political speech. (p. 26)  
 
She continued: 
 The adopting of this draft law … is contrary not only to the provisions of the 
 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, but is at odds with the International 
 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR]. The National Assembly would, 
 by protecting human rights, in fact, provide the most brutal violation of human 
 rights (pg. 30). 
 
                                                
76 Member of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Communist successor party and the party of Slobodan 
Milosevic 
77 Transcript. National Assembly. May 29, 2003. 
78 deputy vice-president of the Serbian Radical Party 
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Dejan Mihajlov79 also argued that the law would be selectively applied and questioned 
why it only dealt with human rights abuses committed after Yugoslavia’s ratification of 
the ICCPR in 1976. He thought this granted amnesty to human rights violations 
committed prior to that year and argued that the law should apply to any violations 
committed after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.  
Do you want to grant amnesty from responsibility … for those who shot 
professors at the Faculty of Law at the beginning of the [19]70s? Do you want to 
pardon them from liability? Probably you do. And if you do not, you would start 
it in 1948 (pg. 15). 
 
Thus, the invocation of human rights and the framing of the law as “accountability for 
human rights violations,” opened a rhetorical space that allowed the law to be criticized 
and, ultimately, ignored. This echoes the finding of Williams, Szczerbiak, and Fowler 
(2005:20) whose analysis of lustration debates in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland 
found that coalition-building among parties to support lustration was most successful 
when the discussion was removed from the frame of transitional justice, thereby relieving 
lustration of the “expectations that accompany and often paralyse conventional judicial 
approaches to the past.” 
  A further indication of a weak design was the deliberate choice to pursue what 
proponents called a “soft”80 model of lustration, in contrast to the “hard” forms of 
lustration established in the Czech Republic or Poland. This was intended as a strategy to 
                                                
79 Member of Parliament. Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). (DSS is a right-wing party, and should not be 
confused with the left-wing Democratic Party [DS]). May 29, 2003 
80 The law is “soft” in that it does not apply to as many public positions and the ban from office is not as 
long as in some other countries. 
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bring potential lustration opponents on board with the law. Aleksandra Joksimovic81 
spoke to this strategy: 
We wanted anything that could be finally accepted by all sides. So we said, “OK, 
let’s have a soft model,” which could be chewable to everyone. But unfortunately, 
even that kind of model, the way it was adopted, was not implemented at all. 
Never. 
 
In further remarks from the floor of the Assembly, Gordana Pop-Lazic argued that a soft 
model was not needed because informal lustration was already going on in Serbia: 
Lustration in Serbia started a long time ago … on October 5, 2000 [date 
Milosevic was removed from power]. … Abusing [Milorad] Komrakov [a 
journalist] and a number of directors of social and public enterprises in Serbia, 
you are already on the way to performing lustration in some way, punishing those 
people and stigmatizing them in public (pg. 27). 
 
In sum, there were multiple issues of framing that combined to give the law a weak 
design. 
 
Inadeqaute or Conflicting Institutional Supports 
The political-institutional literature identifies characteristics that contribute to 
increasing on state capacity and the power of state agencies. Particularly important 
resources include: sufficient money, trained personnel who are granted real power, and a 
developed bureaucratic structure. Agencies lacking such resources should not be able to 
wield much power (Pedriana and Stryker 2004). Such was the case with the lustration 
commission that was to be formed to implement the screenings of persons subject to the 
law in Serbia. The commission was meant to have 9 members, but the Assembly 
                                                
81 Personal Communication. June 23, 2011. Belgrade, Serbia. Ms. Joksimovic is a former assistant foreign 
minister and was a member of parliament at the time the lustration law was adopted, serving from 2000 to 
2004. 
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approved only 8 members. Despite this, the commission met on October 20, 2003 and 
decided not to implement vetting for the forthcoming December parliamentary elections 
“in part because the field of 5000 - 6000 candidates was too large a number to 
investigate, and also no consensus was reached on investigating only the 250 who 
secured mandates in the election.”82 
The commission, therefore, lacked sufficient personnel to carry out its job. This 
was not that unusual, though, for Serbia. Both the former and current executive directors 
of CAA noted parallels between the failed attempt to implement lustration and an earlier 
unsuccessful attempt at launching a truth commission in Serbia.  According to 
Aleksandar Resanovic83, 
Something very similar happened also in 2001 when it was established a 
commission for truth and reconciliation. Actually this commission only met just a 
few times. And somehow in 2003 it disappeared. … [The Federal Republic of] 
Yugoslavia moved to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro.84 A lot of these state 
authorities that had been established at the level of Yugoslavia just disappeared. 
So it also shows that there was not a political will for such a commission. … 
Talking about human rights, there [was] not political will at that time. We as 
people of Yugoslavia and Serbia and Montenegro were not ready to accept 
responsibility for everything [that] happened in … the period of 1991 to 1995. … 
So nothing was happened about this [truth] commission, and nothing was 
happened about the commission on lustration.85 
 
 
Marina Jelic86 made a similar point: 
                                                
82 2006 United Nations Development Report report prepared by Louis Aucoin and Eileen Babbitt, p. 104. 
83 Mr. Resanovic is the former executive director of CAA and is currently serving as the Deputy 
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection in Serbia. 
84 See timeline at the end of this chapter for details of the evolving names of Yugoslavia and its successors.	  
85 Personal Communication. June 8, 2011. Belgrade, Serbia. 
86 Ms. Jelic is the current executive director of the Center for Peace and Democracy Development (formerly 
known as CAA). 
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We had some commission, which Kostunica87 formed. The main point was to deal 
with the past, but I think it was only formed just to say, ‘Oh, we will deal with it.’ 
But they never did anything. There were I think 12-13 people who were engaged, 
but I don’t think they had any particular initiative or any meetings. They just 
established [the commission] and that was it. They established not to deal with 
[the past]. [Laughs.]88 
 
I asked Aleksandra Joksimovic whether it was common for laws in Serbia to go 
unenforced and, if so, why. She said it is common and gave what amounted to a 
neoinstitutionalist argument about the influence of the international community. 
In transitional periods, you’re always looking for some goal which will lead you 
to economic development, international recognition as a democratic country, and 
so on. But you also have forces inside the country who are against some particular 
law, some implementation of particular rules. And from time to time I have to say 
that maybe we are playing to the international community. You are forced to 
adopt some law in order to coordinate your activities with the European Union 
and legislation. And you do it. And you can say, “OK, law #55 is adopted and is 
in accordance with European law now.” But nothing happens on the ground 
because you have different lobby groups which are against the implementation. 
 
Poor Timing 
 A third problem with the lustration law is the issue of when it was adopted. As 
detailed above, the law was pushed through the National Assembly using emergency 
procedures in the months following the assassination of the Prime Minister Djindjic. 
According to Aleksandar Resanovic, 
No one wanted to do adopt such a law. It happened in May 2003, just two months 
after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, and it was just because of that. 
… I do not believe that this law would pass if nothing had happened. Just because 
of the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic. … Otherwise, in a normal 
situation in Serbia, the relationship between the nationalistic parties and the pro-
European parties [would not have allowed for the adoption of the law].  
 
                                                
87 Vojislav Kostunica, President of Yugoslavia [Serbia], 2000-2003; Prime Minister of Serbia, 2004-2008 
88 Personal Communication. June 16, 2011. Belgrade, Serbia.	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The passage of the lustration law under such conditions is an example of what journalist 
Naomi Klein (2007) refers to as the “shock doctrine.” That is the name she gives to the 
strategy used by governments to take advantage of “shocks”—which could be a natural 
disaster, an economic crisis, a terrorist attack, etc.—to justify the passage of a law that 
would otherwise be difficult to adopt. The ruling party in Serbia was able to take 
advantage of Djindjic’s assassination and the state of emergency that followed that event 
to push through the law. In one sense, this is an example of good timing, rather than poor 
timing. On the other hand, the lustration law alienated the opposition parties, who walked 
out of the debate.  New elections were held later that year, and the opposition Serbian 
Radical Party gained control of the Assembly. Thus, issues of timing both enabled the 
passage of the lustration law and led to its demise. 
In addition to the three factors identified by Patashnik and Zelizer (2009) that 
inhibit policy feedback, I add two more: regulatory capture and stoking conspiracy 
theories. 
 
Regulatory Capture 
Regulatory capture is a term used to refer to a type of corruption that results when 
persons who should be subject to a law end up being in charge of its enforcement. 
Aleksandra Joksimovic suggested that the government that came to power in December 
2003 could not remain in office if the law were to be implemented. This was likely true, 
as the party that won the elections was the Serbian Radical Party. The leader of that party 
was Vojislav Seselj. He did not stand for the 2003 elections because he voluntarily 
surrendered to the ICTY in February of that year to stand trial for charges of war 
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crimes.89 Other persons in his party, however, were likely targets of lustration. According 
to Ms. Joksimovic: 
Reasons why in 2003 it was so sensitive was in fact that already in ruling 
coalition, after democratic changes, as part of the coalition, were some people 
who were involved in the Milosevic party once upon a time. And, therefore, some 
of them were afraid that it could become a tool for political comeback, which is 
always sensitive. Nowadays, I think it just can’t be implemented because we will 
lose the government as such. … The ruling coalition wouldn’t exist. You have the 
Milosevic party as a coalition partner in the government, which means that if you 
will lose [them], you won’t have a government. And I’m afraid that any future 
government will not be possible to be composed without some people from the 
past. They have changed, some of them, changed their approach, like in any other 
transitional country. … The late prime minister would say, “From the aquarium 
you can make fish soup. But from fish soup you can never create the aquarium 
again.” 
 
This situation is a bit different from what happened in Croatia. In Croatia, people like 
Tudjman and Manolic, who would have been subjected to lustration, were already in 
power and were able to prevent the lustration law from being adopted. By contrast, the 
persons who would have been subjected to lustration came to power after the law was in 
place and ignored it. 
 
Stoking Conspiracy Theories 
 
I suggest as a final factor that inhibits policy feedback the stoking of conspiracy theories. 
One of the unexpected themes to emerge in my coding of the Serbian debate transcripts is 
the invocation of George Soros as the person pulling the strings behind the scenes to push 
for the law. Soros is a Hungarian-American billionaire who expends considerable money 
and effort promoting democracy, particularly in his native Eastern Europe, through his 
                                                
89 As of November 2013, the verdict in the Seselj trial has been put on hold after the dismissal of one of the 
judges hearing the case. Seselj claims his rights have been violated and is demanding 12 million EUR from 
the court. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/seselj-asks-12-million-euros-from-the-hague 
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Open Society Foundation. Soros is a favorite liberal bogeyman of the right wing in the 
United States due to his financial backing of the Democratic Party,90 and it appears that 
the same is true in Serbia. But the ire for Soros did not appear out of thin air. The 
lustration debate occurred on the same day, May 29, that Soros visited Belgrade where he 
held a press conference urging Serbia to grant independence to Kosovo as a means of 
earning membership in the European Union quickly.91 
One way to defeat or, at the least, discredit a law is to play on people’s fears and 
resentments. The following exchange between MP Velimir Simonovic and the President 
of the Assembly shows Simonovic’s attempt to do that by playing on nationalist and 
ethnic concerns: 
SIMONOVIC: I was very surprised yesterday [to learn] that a certain great enemy 
of ours, a Mr. Soros, may hold a press conference in the middle of Belgrade. I 
learned later what he said. Watch out—this [lustration] is its [presumably 
referring to control of the Serbian government] second stage, and the first phase 
was to finance non-governmental organizations, and perhaps some political 
parties. 
 
PRESIDENT: I’m warning you to get back on the agenda. … According to the 
rules, you cannot hold a press conference and hold a politics class as you like. 
Now you have to talk about the bill. 
 
SIMONOVIC: I’m saying this because the law is unnecessary. Please do not 
interrupt me. So [Soros] publicly declared that Kosovo and Metohija, that the 
Serbian Republic should be drowned in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Serbia and 
Montenegro should be independent states, and the Macedonians—let’s see what 
to do with the Albanians. (pg. 53) 
 
Similarly, Zoran Andjelkovic,92 linked Soros’s visit to Belgrade with the lustration law. 
                                                
90 See, for example, http://www.businessinsider.com/christine-odonnell-george-soros-is-after-me-2010-12. 
91 http://www.osim.org.me/fosi_rom_en/english/g_soros_media.htm 
92 Andjelkovic was once described by a report in the New York Times as “one of the organizers of the ethnic 
discrimination and suppression of Albanians in Kosovo during the last decade and a proven and loyal ally 
of President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia” (Gall 1999, np). Readers should bear in mind that he 1) 
would likely be banned from office under the lustration law, and 2) would likely take particular offense to 
the idea that Kosovo should be independent of Serbia. 
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I am convinced that this law would not have come to the agenda if Mr. Soros had 
not come to Belgrade. But as Mr. Soros came to Belgrade, he of course funded 
them [the government], and they are likely to have a commitment to him, … so of 
course we came to [have this] Soros law, ie. lustration law. (pg. 85) 
 
III. Macedonia 
To gain additional leverage on the analysis of the Serbian case, I will briefly contrast it 
with the case of Macedonia. I argue that the 5 factors that thwarted the implementation of 
the lustration law in Serbia are not present in Macedonia, a country that does enforce its 
lustration law. 
 
Stronger Policy Design 
Macedonia avoided the problems caused by an ambiguous appeal to “human rights” in its 
lustration law by instead framing lustration as a matter of employment regulation. As 
indicated by the title of the law ("Law on Additional Requirements for Public Office”), 
the screening process is presented as just one further criterion, an “additional 
requirement,” that must be met for holding certain jobs. Lustration in this instance is 
similar, then, to obtaining a university degree or other certification meant to regulate a 
profession. It does not proclaim, in this framing, to have the lofty goals of justice or 
accountability. Thus, by minimizing the scope of lustration in Macedonia, it is not 
susceptible to the same types of criticism from opponents as in Serbia. 
 
Adequate Institutional Support 
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The Data Verification Commission, the regulatory body that implements Macedonia’s 
lustration law, receives institutional support in ways that its Serbian counterpart never 
did. The Commission receives an office, occupying the 17th floor of the national 
broadcaster’s building in Skopje. Moreover, the Commission is funded through the 
national budget. The 11-member team is provided a staff of civil servants to carry out 
“professional, administrative, and technical matters” such as liaising with other state 
agencies and communicating with the public. Members of the Commission and their staff 
are granted a security clearance, giving them access to the state secrets necessary for 
fulfilling their jobs.93  
In January 2014, as the term of all members on the Commission expired, the 
opposition Social Democrats threatened not to support an extension or replacement of 
anyone on the Commission, thereby denying the two-thirds majority of parliament that is 
necessary to place persons on the Commission. The Social Democrats insist that the 
lustration process has been abused for the purposes of “political retaliation.”94 However, 
it is expected that if a first vote to elect new members to the Commission fails, a second 
vote will only require a simple majority. 
 
Timing 
The implementation of the lustration law in Macedonia has been made possible by the 
continuing presence in office of the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE party. After a brief 
initial stint in power in coalition with an ethnic Albanian party from 1998 to 2002, 
                                                
93 “Report for the period 1-15-2013 to 7-15-2-13” available at: http://www.kvf.org.mk/index.php/en/reports 
94 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-opposition-shuns-election-of-collaborator-hunters	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VMRO-DPMNE regained control of the government on its own in 2006. Consistent with 
findings from Chapter 2, VMRO-DPMNE voted in favor of lustration in 2008. The party 
has maintained power since 2006, and it seems likely that the law will continue to be 
enforced as long as VMRO-DPMNE is the majority party. 
 
Regulatory Capture and the Role of George Soros 
Unlike in Serbia, where there is a sense that the persons who should have been 
lustrated were the ones controlling the process, there is a sense in Macedonia that 
lustration has gone overboard. That is, in an egregious abuse of power, persons are being 
lustrated who ought not to be. Such is the view of the Social Democratic party (cited 
above), who initially supported the law in 2008 but have come to oppose it. Thus, the 
concern in Macedonia is not one of regulatory capture, but one of abuse. An example 
involving, perhaps bizarrely, George Soros will illustrate this issue. In Serbia, Soros was 
viewed by the right as being behind the lustration law. In Macedonia, Soros has been 
punished by the law, at least indirectly. 
One of the early supporters of a lustration law in Macedonia was the Foundation 
Open Society Institute – Macedonia (FOSIM), which is a Soros-funded NGO in Skopje. 
However, as explained to me by Neda Korunovska95, FOSIM withdrew its support for the 
law after Macedonia adopted a law that granted citizens some access to their own secret 
police files. In FOSIM’s view, lustration was no longer necessary once that concession 
                                                
95 At the time of our interview, January 21, 2011, Ms. Korunovska was the Law Program Coordinator for 
FOSIM. 
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was made. Thus, starting around 2006, FOSIM actively worked against the adoption of a 
lustration law.  
Then in July 2011, the Commission named FOSIM’s director, Vladimir Milcin, a 
former spy. To the public, it may now seem that FOSIM’s opposition to lustration was to 
protect Milcin’s past from being revealed. However, Milcin vehemently denies the claims 
of the Commission and says exculpatory documents showing that he was a victim of 
spying rather than a spy himself were deliberately withheld. Milcin insists that he was 
targeted for being a critic of the VMRO-DPMNE government. At a press conference in 
August 2012, Milcin said, ““The goal of this lustration is not to settle the injustices of the 
past, but to tarnish people’s reputation” and said the head of the Commission is “a ‘tumor 
in our society’ who causes ‘repulsiveness’ with his ‘industrious servility’ to the 
government of Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski”96 
 
Conclusion 
The case of lustration in Serbia illustrates the limits of policy feedback. Although 
current policies should be constrained by past policies, that was not the case in Serbia. 
The implementation of the lustration law was inhibited by several factors. Certain aspects 
of the law were poorly conceived and, therefore, open to attack from the opposition. In 
particular, the definition of human rights violations was considered to be variously too 
ambiguous or too narrow. The charge that the law could be applied selectively was given 
more force by a seemingly arbitrary start date of 1976 for lustrable offenses. The 
lustration commission was given neither adequate staff nor sufficient time to carry out its 
                                                
96 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonian-ngo-chief-to-sue-lustration-body	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mission. Like the failed truth commission before it, it was a weak institution that did not 
accomplish anything. Timing was both a friend and an enemy of the lustration law: the 
prime minister’s assassination enabled the law to be passed under conditions that 
normally could not have been employed, but the use of those special procedures alienated 
the opposition party. That party, the far-right Serbian Radical Party, went on to win the 
next round of elections six months after the law was adopted. Their victory resulted in a 
type of regulatory capture by placing in charge of lustration one of the parties most likely 
to lose members as a result of the process. Finally, the lustration debates happened to 
coincide with a visit to Belgrade by George Soros. Serbian nationalists rejected his views 
on the status of Kosovo and suggested that he played a part in adopting the lustration law. 
By inserting conspiracy theories and stoking ethnic resentment, the law became easier to 
ignore as something foreign to Serbia.  
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Appendix 4.1 Timeline of Events in Croatia 
1946  Aleksandar Ranković installed as first Minister of the Internal Affairs of  
  Yugoslavia by President Josip Broz Tito 
1966  Ranković removed from office, restructuring of secret police begins 
early 1970s Croatian Spring movement 
1983  Stjepan Đureković assassinated in Wolfratshausen, West Germany,  
  allegedly carried out by former Croatian secret police director Josip  
  Perković 
1989  HDZ formed 
1990  HDZ wins first democratic elections in Republic of Croatia;  
  Dinamo/Red Star soccer riot in Zagreb 
1991-95 Croatian War of Independence 
1998  HSP introduces first lustration bill 
1999  HSP introduces second lustration bill  
  Franjo Tudjman dies 
2009  Germany issues arrest warrant for Perković 
2013  Croatia accedes to the European Union, acquiesces to demand from  
  Germany to extradite Perković 
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Appendix 4.2 Timeline of the Breakup of Yugoslavia 
1943 – 1992  Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
  
 Successor states of SFRY: 
 1991 – present  Republic of Slovenia 
 1991 – present  Republic of Croatia 
 1991 – present  Republic of Macedonia 
 1992 – present  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
1992 – 2003  Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (successor of SFRY) 
 
2003 – 2006 State Union of Serbia & Montenegro (successor of FRY) 
  
 Successor states of Serbia & Montenegro: 
2006 – present  Montenegro 
2006 – present  Republic of Serbia 
 
Disputed successor state of Serbia: 
2008 – present  Republic of Kosovo  
(not recognized as independent by Serbia) 
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Appendix 4.3 Additional Analysis of Serbian Survey Data 
 As part of a separate unpublished manuscript, I have done statistical modeling on 
the survey data from Serbia.97 The survey asks respondents about a series of 22 events 
that occurred during the 1990s Yugoslav wars. For each event (e.g., the siege of 
Sarajevo), the survey asks the following questions: 
 1) Have you heard of the event? 
 2) If you have heard of the event, do you believe it happened? 
 3) If you believe the event happened, do you view it as an inevitability of war, or 
 as a war crime? 
 
 
 Of the 22 events that are included in the survey, 16 were perpetrated by ethnic 
Serbs against non-Serbs.98 I use latent class analysis to categorize persons based on their 
responses to the questions about those 16 events. I create four categories:  
 1) low-information persons, who have heard of very few events, 
 2) skeptics, who have heard of but doubt that many of the events took place, 
 3) belligerents, who tend to view Serb-perpetrated events as inevitabilities of war, 
 4) and critics, who view most Serb-perpetrated events as war crimes. 
 
 
 I then use those latent classes to estimate several logistic and OLS regression 
models, depending on the structure of the dependent variable, to see if memories have 
differential effects on support for a range of five transitional justice mechanisms. I 
                                                
97 I am grateful to Zarko Markovic of the Belgrade Center for Human Rights for providing me with the 
microdata from this survey. 
98 I use this restriction to avoid the confounding effects of ethnicity, as people from all ethnic groups tend to 
be ethnocentric in their view of what is a war crime versus what is an inevilability of war. view events 
perpetrated by other ethnic groups as war crimes and events perpetrated by their own ethnic group as 
inevitabilities of war. 
  109 
control for the respondent's age, level of education, sex, ethnicity, residence in Belgrade, 
regularity of viewing footage from ICTY proceedings, and news source for information 
about the ICTY. 
 I estimate models that gauge support for lustration, the ICTY, domestic Serbian 
courts, a one-sided official state apology by Serbia to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and a truth commission. I find that lustration is the only mechanism of transitional justice 
for which the odds of support do not vary by latent class (i.e., memory category). That is, 
low-information persons, skeptics, belligerents, and critics do not differ in their odds of 
supporting lustration, net of other characteristics. I find that memory categories do matter 
in terms of support for the other four transitional justice mechanisms. It is likely, though, 
that if lustration were to be carried out in Serbia, the four groups would differ in terms of 
who they think should be lustrated and support for the policy would diminish within some 
latent classes. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
Summary of Findings 
This dissertation has sought to answer the general question of, "What accounts for 
lustration?" In chapter 2, I use quantitative analysis to answer the more specific question 
of "What factors account for the proposal and adoption of lustration policies?" The 
chapter breaks new ground in that it is based on an original dataset covering all post-
Communist countries for the period 1989 to 2012, thereby including all positive and 
negative cases of lustration. This differs from most of the literature on lustration, which 
tends to argue from only a handful of positive case studies. The chapter is also innovative 
in that it considers the possibility that there are separate processes at work for the 
proposal and the adoption of lustration policies. I adopt Stan's (2008) classification of 
explanations as emphasizing either the "politics of the past," meaning the period up to 
and including the transition from Communism, or the "politics of the present," referring 
to the post-Communist period. Within those broad categories, I test 7 hypotheses from 
the literature about the adoption of lustration. The following explanations are considered 
in both bivariate and multivariate discrete-time logistic regression models: 
 1) type of transition to democracy 
 2) the configuration of opposition movements, elite relationship to the regime, 
 and a pre-Communist history of democracy 
 3) the left-right ideology of the ruling party 
 4) the legitimacy of the Communist regime 
 5) ratification of two human rights treaties. 
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  In bivariate analysis of lustration proposal, I find that the "politics of the past" 
arguments do the best job of explaining whether such policies are proposed. Countries 
that undergo a replacement transition, where the outgoing regime has no leverage with 
which to protect itself, are very likely to propose lustration. Countries with relatively 
weak opposition movements during the Communist period are much less likely to 
propose lustration than those that had stronger opposition movements. Higher levels of 
democratization and wealth also indicate a higher likelihood of proposing a lustration 
bill. I find that time, regardless of how it is measured, is not significant. This means that 
the odds of proposing a lustration bill do not vary over time. Such a finding is a contrast 
to Samuel Huntington's (1991) prediction that justice in transitional societies either 
happens right after the transition or not at all. Ratification of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) is associated with higher odds of proposing lustration, but this 
finding runs counter to the hypothesis based on world polity neoinstitutionalism. Because 
the international community, including the court that adjudicates cases dealing with the 
ECHR, is largely anti-lustration, I would expect ratification of the ECHR to be negatively 
associated with proposing lustration. This finding was not borne out by the data. 
 In multivariate analysis of lustration proposal, I use trimmed models that only 
include variables that were significant in bivariate analyses due to the relatively small 
sample sizes. I find that countries that undergo a replacement transition to democracy and 
countries that have a high level of democratization are the most likely to propose 
lustration. Other variables that were significant in bivariate analysis wither under the gaze 
of the multivariate model. 
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 In the bivariate analyses of lustration adoption, I find that both the politics of the 
past and the politics of the present arguments have merit. Stan's classificatory scheme is 
significant for some countries, indicating that there are lower odds of adopting lustration 
in countries where the elites were co-opted into the Communist regime. Consistent with 
Welsh's (1994) argument, Left parties are much less likely to adopt lustration that Right 
or unclassified parties. Level of democratization and GDP are again positively associated 
with lustration adoption. In multivariate models, only level of democratization and Left 
party rule remain statistically significant. 
 The findings show a consistently strong effect for democratization. This is 
somewhat puzzling given the anti-democratic nature of lustration laws, at least from an 
American liberal understanding of democracy that emphasizes individual rights over 
communal rights. I suggest that there must be some aspect of democracies that is driving 
the adoption of lustration laws. I tentatively offer the suggestion that it is the constraining 
effects of past policy regarding the regulation of the security sector that is operating to 
give democratization a consistently significant effect. 
 It should be noted that Chapter 2 is somewhat limited by data problems. A very 
plausible explanation for differences in lustration across countries is that the level of 
repression differed from country to country. It was not possible to include level of 
repression under Communism as a variable in my models because of a lack of data. The 
data that would normally be used to measure such repression, the Political Terror Scale, 
suffers from two problems: the data only go back to 1976, and the data are only available 
for countries that existed at the time. Thus, early repressive episodes, such as in the 
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Soviet Union in the 1930’s, Hungary in 1956, or Czechoslovakia in 1968, are not 
reflected in the PTS. Also, there are not separate repression scores available in the PTS 
for each of the constituent Soviet or Yugoslav republics until those republics gain 
independence. It is not possible, therefore, to compare levels of repression across what at 
the time were sub-national units. 
Another plausible explanation for differences in the implementation of lustration 
is the availability of qualified alternate personnel to take the place of persons removed 
from office. For example, a country may be more likely to implement lustration against 
judges if there are many persons with legal training who are driving taxis, essentially 
waiting in the wings to fill those vacated positions, than if there is a dearth of such 
surplus qualified persons. To test such a hypothesis, one would need data on both the 
extent of lustration in a given country and data on underemployment by sector. I did not 
have access to such data, so I did not test this hypothesis in Chapter 2. 
 The original intent of my dissertation was to examine the influence of 
international actors on the adoption of lustration laws. After traveling to Croatia, Serbia, 
and Macedonia and speaking with 30 key informants from academia, government, and 
civil society, I found that there was very little influence from international actors. Thus, 
chapter 3 is an attempt to explain this finding. From the perspective of world polity 
neoinstitutionalism, is paradoxical that the diffusion of lustration laws is happening in 
spite of negative pressure from the European Court of Human Rights, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the International Labor Organization, Human Rights 
Watch, and other international bodies. I attempt to reconcile the predictions of WPN with 
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the empirical reality by employing a variant of Burawoy's (1991) extended case method. I 
draw on documents from the aforementioned international actors and my interviews to 
build new concepts and propose relationships among those concepts so as to account for 
the paradoxical case of lustration. I argue that the presence of legal constraint that 
prevents the implementation of a preferred norm means that an alternative means of 
carrying out the norm must be found. Such alternatives are likely to be found among 
practices that have resonance with a given population due to their congruence with a 
schematic antecedent. Finally, diffusion may occur when legitimacy is conferred not 
through the international system, per se, but rather through the legitimacy of a particular 
actor--in this case, Germany--whose experiences can be seen as similar to those of other 
countries. 
 In chapter 4, I present the cases of three former Yugoslav republics: Croatia, 
Serbia, and Macedonia. I chose to compare these three cases because they have had 
different outcomes with respect to implementing lustration. Lustration bills were 
proposed in lustration on two occasions but were not adopted either time; Serbia adopted 
a lustration law in 2003 but never enforced it; and Macedonia both adopted and enforced 
its lustration laws. Because an examination of the Macedonian case does not offer much 
in the way of theoretical gain, I use it only as a reference against which to compare 
Croatia and Serbia. Macedonia shows that it is possible to implement lustration 
"successfully" in the former Yugoslavia, but not much else. Thus, my comparison really 
focuses on the other two former republics. I employ Stryker's (1996) strategic narrative 
method to conduct the comparison. I show how the lack of lustration in Croatia is a 
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theoretical and empirical anomaly. That is, lustration should have occurred under existing 
explanations of lustration, but it did not. Building from that, I then offer an explanation as 
to why Croatia did not lustrate and try to frame that explanation in general theoretical 
terms. Based on interviews and documents from the Croatian intelligence service, I argue 
that the exigencies of an impending hot war, building the security sector from the ground 
up would not be feasible. This could apply to other transitional countries, which often 
face situations of insecurity upon the adoption of a new regime. Most of the post-
Communist states did not experience such insecurity, but one could easily imagine 
lustration-like policies not being implemented in the newly transitional countries of 
Egypt or Libya for similar reasons as in Croatia. 
 Further, I use the case the assassination of Stjepan Djurekovic, allegedly by Josip 
Perkovic, to illustrate how the Croatian secret police, specifically, came to be populated 
with serious violators of human rights. More so than the other secret police forces in 
Yugoslavia, which achieved a large degree of autonomy in each republic after the 1966 
firing of Aleksandar Rankovic, Croatia's secret police engaged in two-decade 
assassination campaign abroad. Agents like Perkovic became friendly with the post-
Communist Tudjman regime and were protected from retaliation for many years. Only 
very recently has that started to change. Croatia's entry to the European Union in July 
2013 has made it more susceptible to international pressure to extradite Perkovic to face 
questioning in Germany for the death of Djurekovic. 
 The Croatian case, then, illustrates a certain degree of path dependency that 
explains why lustration did not occur there. For me, path dependence refers to “social 
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processes that exhibit positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical 
development” (Pierson 2004:21), patterns “that are inherently difficult to reverse” 
(Hacker 2002:54). By contrast, the Serbian case shows the limitations of path-dependent 
explanations. Despite the passage of a lustration law in 2003, subsequent governments 
have not enforced it, indicating that they have not been constrained by past policy as 
would be expected under theories of policy feedback. Instead, the Serbian law was 
undermined in several ways. Consistent with Patashnik and Zelizer (2009), I argue that 
the Serbian law had a weak design that allowed for successful reprobation by the 
opposition parties; inadequate institutional support in the form of an understaffed and 
overburdened lustration commission; and poor timing in that the opposition party who 
was alienated by the law's passage under emergency procedures came to power only six 
months after the law went into effect. I suggest two additional mechanisms to supplement 
Patashnik and Zelizer's model: regulatory capture and conspiracy theories. The party that 
came to power under the above conditions, the Serbian Radical Party, was also the party 
that would be highly susceptible to being lustrated out of office. They had no incentive to 
enforce the law, just as Franjo Tudjman had no incentive to allow the lustration bill in 
Croatia to come to a vote. Also, the use of conspiracy theories about George Soros's 
involvement with the lustration law was used to stoke ethnic resentment about his views 
on Kosovo, the largely ethnic Albanian province of Serbia. Suggestions of Soros's 
outside influence were discrediting to the law. 
 Some readers may argue that the Serbian law was deliberately not enforced--that 
it was meant to placate the international community by being on the books but not to be a 
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real piece of legislation. Although this is no doubt the case with many human rights 
policies around the world (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), I do not buy that argument 
with respect to Serbia. As best I can tell, there was no demand from the international 
community that Serbia engage in lustration. Who, then, is the audience for a law that is 
strategically unenforced? The international community was very clear with respect to 
Serbia's post-war course of action: it was to comply with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including by handing over all indicted fugitives. 
Serbia finally completed this task in 2011 by handing over Ratko Mladic and Goran 
Hadzic. The proof of Serbia's requirement to do so is in the proverbial pudding: three 
months after arresting Hadzic in July, the European Commission recommended that 
Serbia be given official Candidate status with respect to European Union accession. That 
status was granted in February 2012, without any expectation that Serbia engage in 
lustration.99 
 Taken together, the empirical chapters of this dissertation suggest that lustration is 
a process that is largely driven by internal processes: democratization, legal structures, 
and, under certain conditions, policy legacies. The important international factors driving 
lustration appear to come from the regional level, rather than the global, and are 
contingent upon a state’s ability to see its own history as similar to or connected with that 
of another state. 
 
 
                                                
99 Barlovac, Bojana. 2012. "Brussels Grants Serbia EU Candidacy" Balkan Insight. March 1. 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/brussels-to-confirm-serbia-s-candidacy 
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The Bigger Picture: Lustration, Transitional Justice, and Democratization 
 In this section, I will argue that lustration is improperly categorized as a form of 
transitional justice by both academics and policy makers, since it is neither transitional 
nor just. I claim that to be properly regarded as "transitional," lustration must be time 
bounded in its application in a way that is not necessarily true of other forms of 
transitional justice, like prosecutions and truth commissions. While it is the case, as I 
discussed in the section of this dissertation dealing with prognostic bridging and the 
example of Germany, that countries can be slow to begin to come to terms with the past, 
lustration is a process whose value declines with the passage of time if its purpose truly is 
to remove human rights abusers from office.100 There is a natural attrition from public life 
with the passage of time. This point was made by Zarko Puhovski at one of the meetings 
organized by CDRSEE to promote lustration in Southeastern Europe: 
 A professional career can be for, let's say, a maximum of 40 years. So, nothing 
 that has occurred over 40 years ago can be relevant for lustration, because 
 lustration is dealing with concrete persons and a possible disqualification of these 
 persons in public life. There is no basis for disqualifying someone for something 
 done when he or she was 17 years old and if he or she is now 85 or even older.101 
 
I would contend that prosecuting such a person for criminal activity, or seeking to 
uncover the truth about actions committed by such a person, would still be appropriate, 
                                                
100 As a corollary to this punitive purpose of lustration, some may argue that lustration exists to change the 
culture of policy making in institutions like the police, the military, or the judiciary, that lingers even after a 
transition to democracy. In this formulation, removing persons from office not only punishes the 
individuals, but also provides needed reform to the agents of state power--especially those that might be 
slow to change. In my view, removing personnel from office is not sufficient for changing the culture of an 
institution, which is likely to retain a culture through inertia even in the absence of specific individuals. To 
address such institutional "stickiness," one must change the incentive structure within the agency. For 
example, changing the requirements for promotion or other rewards within an institution are more likely to 
result in a change to a potentially repressive culture that has held over from the ancien regime. 
101 Disclosing Hidden History, p. 121 
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even at the age of 85. But a ban from public life is superfluous. Moreover, the idea of the 
time-boundedness of lustration has been expressed by both the European Court of Human 
Rights, as expressed in the Adamson case cited in Chapter 3, and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. PACOE fixes the date for the end of lustration 
processes at December 31, 1999, because "the new democratic system should be 
consolidated by that time in all former communist totalitarian countries."102 Further, 
many of the informants I spoke to in Croatia and Serbia--including those who were 
otherwise supportive of the idea of lustration--argued that it was "too late" to implement 
lustration in those countries. This was the view taken by, among others, Aleksandra 
Joksimovic in 2011. She argued that lustration should have been pursued in the months 
following the October 5, 2000, revolution that unseated Milosevic. Because lustration is 
happening well beyond these time frames in many countries, it is better regarded as open-
ended rather than transitional. 
 Second, lustration is not just. I believe this point is well illustrated in Chapter 3, 
particularly as concerns the lack of due process afforded to the accused. Another very 
problematic aspect of lustration is the targeting of collaborators, rather than merely the 
secret police themselves. It is not usually known from a secret police file the 
circumstances surrounding someone's collaboration. Was the person actually an 
informant, or was the person listed as an informant without their knowledge so that the 
police officer could meet a recruitment quota? If the person did inform, what kind of 
duress was the person put under to consent to doing so? Were they or their family 
threatened? Blackmailed? Tortured? If so, it is hardly just to punish them in the same way 
                                                
102 Resolution 1096 
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as the secret police themselves. Because this information is not contained in the files, and 
the files are documents upon which decisions about lustration rely, there can be no fair 
screening of informants. 
 Finally, I must return to the point I made in the introductory chapter regarding the 
balance of power among the branches of government. Saskia Sassen (2008) argues that 
the neoliberal economic system has expanded the power of executives and limited the 
power of legislatures. I believe that lustration and "transitional justice" measures show a 
countervailing trend: it used to be that executives (here I include state security services as 
they are tasked with enforcing the law) never or only rarely faced accountability for 
human rights abuses. The fact that they now do, at least sometimes, face such 
accountability, is evidence that courts and legislatures are asserting their power over 
executives. Charles Tilly, in his synthetic work on democracy, argues for a dynamic, 
process-oriented definition of democracy: “a regime is democratic to the degree that 
political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and 
mutually binding consultation” (2007:14). To this definition, I would add that a regime is 
democratic to the degree that the branches of state power exhibit broad, equal, protected 
and mutually binding consultation among themselves, not only with respect to state-
citizen relations. To the extent that lustration is a means reigning in the power of the 
security services, I would say that it contributes to democracy as defined by my 
addendum to Tilly's definition. However, as I have just noted above, lustration is often 
unjustly applied, and does not provide adequate protection of citizens by the state. 
Lustration, then, has mixed effects on democracy. My experience in Macedonia suggests 
  121 
that a powerful judiciary is especially important in providing a check on an unrestrained 
lustration process. There, the courts--both constitutional and administrative--have been in 
a pitched battle with the lustration commission and the legislature to settle on a process 
that is fair. This is only an observation based on one country, and further research should 
be done to determine how the balance of power among the branches of government is 
shaped in particular contexts. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
It is my view that the largest impediment to research on lustration or other vetting 
schemes is the availability of good data. The literature could be improved enormously by 
knowing who is lustrated, who is not, under what conditions, and with what 
consequences. Poland, in particular, seems as though it could be fertile ground for 
research that improves our understanding of lustration. Because Poland allows persons 
who confess to collaboration with the secret police to still run for office, I can envision a 
research project on stigmatization that examines the effect of such an admission on one’s 
electoral chances. How does admitting one’s past affect one’s odds of winning? Do they 
vary by gender, political party, region of the country, or office being sought? Do they 
vary by what kind of activity a person is admitting to? Since lustration is in large part an 
exercise in naming, blaming, and shaming, such research is crucial to advancing our 
knowledge of the cultural impact of the policy. 
 Other research should look at vetting policies across regions. Some comparative 
work on this has been done by Mayer-Rieckh and de Greiff (2007), but, particularly in 
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the wake of the Arab Spring, there are new opportunities to learn about vetting systems, 
both those proposed and those enacted. There should also be research on informal vetting 
practices. Informal vetting was referred to in the discussion of Serbia. It entails 
discrimination against persons who may have been associated with the prior regime even 
in the absence of formal policies. There are opportunities for excellent ethnographic and 
interview-based research that looks at informal lustration. 
Finally, further research could look at differences across types of vetting 
practices. In particular, there seem to be differences in how the European Court of 
Human Rights handled post-World War II vetting practices, when states were granted 
more leeway, compared to post-Cold War vetting practices, which have been found to be 
in violation of human rights. An analysis of this change over time in the Court’s 
jurisprudence would be illuminating. 
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